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INTRODUCTION 
 Constitutional rights do not exist in splendid isolation, hermetically 
sealed off from one another.  To the contrary, many constitutional rights 
are actively relational.1  They intersect, associate, converse, and conflict 
with one another, in an ongoing and dynamic process of adjudication, 
scholarly examination, and public discourse.2  These dynamic intersections 
affect constitutional remedies in individual cases.3  More broadly, they in-
fluence interpretations of individual constitutional rights and understand-
ings of constitutional liberty. 
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
Equal Protection Clause have frequently intersected with one another, in 
ways that have illuminated the meaning of both clauses and created distinc-
tive rights.4  In Obergefell v. Hodges,5 which recognized a constitutional right to 
marriage equality, the Supreme Court located the right in both the due pro-
cess and equal protection guarantees.  The Court observed that these provi-
sions are “connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent 
principles,” and observed that the relationship between these provisions “fur-
thers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.”6  As Lau-
rence Tribe has observed, the Court “tightly wound the double helix of Due 
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”7  It excavated 
 
 1 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2016) 
(arguing that the “democratic rights protected by the First Amendment are not independent 
points, but rather are deeply interrelated and overlapping”). 
 2 See Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2014) (observing that freedom of speech 
intersects with a number of constitutional rights, including abortion and Second Amendment 
rights); Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (2016) (examin-
ing judicial analysis where more than one constitutional rights provision is invoked); Kerry 
Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2017) (arguing that constitutional rights frequently intersect and combine in ways that inform 
constitutional remedies). 
 3 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1077 (focusing on how combinations of constitutional clauses affect 
dispositions of cases); Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 (focusing on remedial concerns). 
 4 See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed 
in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”). 
5  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 6 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2586, 2603 (2015). 
 7 Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 17 (2015) 
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and relied upon decades of dynamic intersection between the two clauses.8 
As Obergefell shows, constitutional rights are not isolated textual blots.  
They often relate to, and inform, one another through a process of dynamic 
interaction that places them in proximity to one another.  Current under-
standings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause are the 
product, in part, of its intersection with (among other provisions) the Due 
Process Clause.9  Similarly, as anyone who has taught or taken a First 
Amendment course knows, we cannot truly understand the contemporary 
Free Speech Clause without considering its relationship to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.10  So, too, modern understandings of the Free Exercise 
Clause and Establishment Clause only make sense when we consider their 
dynamic intersection with the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  
What is more, all of these relationships are bi-or multi-directional in the 
sense that the influences and effects run in more than one direction.  In 
sum, in order to fully appreciate and understand constitutional rights, we 
must generally look in more than one direction. 
This Article identifies and analyzes the dynamic process in which con-
stitutional rights intersect and interact with one another.  It refers to this 
process as “Rights Dynamism.”11  Rights Dynamism is related to, but dis-
tinct from, several existing theoretical and interpretive traditions.  The first 
is intratextualism, which posits that constitutional meaning is a product of 
the connections between and among words and phrases in the Constitu-
tion.12  A second tradition is the common law interpretive method, which 
generally shows how constitutional meaning changes or evolves primarily as 
a result of case-by-case adjudication.13  Rights Dynamism also shares some 
 
(emphasis omitted). 
 8 See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148–51 
(2015) (describing the doctrinal journey that led to Obergefell). 
 9 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474 (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the 
equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”). 
 10 See Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Equal Protection, 12 DUKE 
J. LAW & PUB. POL. 13 (2016) (examining in detail the relationship between First Amendment ex-
pressive rights and Fourteenth Amendment equality rights). 
 11 My conception of Rights Dynamism differs from, but shares some major premises with, Professor 
Jack Balkin’s conception.  Balkin defines “rights dynamism” as “the claim that the nature, scope, 
and boundaries of rights, and in particular fundamental rights like speech, are continually shifting 
with historical, political, economic, and technological changes in the world.”  Jack M. Balkin, Dig-
ital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 55 (2004).  Balkin’s conception of rights dynamism is broader than my own, which fo-
cuses in particular on relationships between rights.  But those relationships are, as Balkin suggests, 
contingent and continually subject to change—in part owing to historical, political, and other in-
fluences.  Thus, while we share a major premise, my conception of Rights Dynamism focuses 
primarily on the active intersection of rights and rights provisions.  My central claim is that one of 
the things that significantly influences the meanings of rights provisions is their relationship to 
other rights provisions. 
 12 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 13 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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conceptual space with living originalism, which respects historical meanings 
but also teaches that changes in constitutional meaning are part of a dy-
namic, evolutionary, and public process.14  Finally, Rights Dynamism 
draws upon insights from the study of social movements and civic institu-
tions, which have been critically important to constitutional change.15 
Like intra-textualism, Rights Dynamism is distinctly and consciously re-
lational.  It focuses on and elaborates associations between and among dif-
ferent constitutional provisions.  In some respects, Rights Dynamism’s 
elaborative process resembles the common law tradition.  For example, it 
focuses primarily on judicial construction of individual rights through case-
by-case adjudication.16  Like living originalism, Rights Dynamism acknowl-
edges and accounts for historical intersections and meanings.17  It also 
adopts the perspective that changes in constitutional meaning are part of a 
dynamic, evolutionary, and ongoing process that involves many different 
actors and influences—legislators, courts, litigants, civic institutions, and of 
course the people.18 
Although it shares ideas and concepts with these approaches, Rights 
Dynamism is distinctive.  It is not an abstract theory, or a method of consti-
tutional interpretation that purports to resolve constitutional ambiguities.  
Nor does Rights Dynamism apply the specific methods or conclusions of 
any existing interpretive tradition, including those mentioned.  Rather, it 
focuses on the real-world actions and forces that bring rights together and 
contribute over time to elaborations of their various meanings.  Thus, 
Rights Dynamism is much closer to the ground than high—or even low—
constitutional theory.  As I explain, it is a messy, disorderly, and sometimes 
seemingly illogical process of constitutional interaction and elaboration. 
Constitutional scholars have long taken note of certain links or connec-
tions between individual constitutional rights.19  However, they have not 
 
 14 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 200–01 (2011). 
 15 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States Constitutional Law, at 
11 (for publication with the papers of the Seminario en Latino América de Teoria Constitucional 
y Politica (SELA), June 10-12, 2004, Oaxaca, México) available at 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_Jurisgenerative_Role_of_Soci
al_Movements.pdf; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).  See also DAVID COLE, ENGINES 
OF LIBERTY (2016)  (examining the important role of civic institutions in the process of constitu-
tional change). 
 16 See STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 36 (describing the common law as a system “in which precedents 
evolve, shaped by notions of fairness and good policy”). 
 17 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 235 
(1998) (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned and invoked expressive 
rights in debates concerning equality). 
 18 See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 3 (“In each generation the American people are charged with the 
obligation to flesh out and implement text and principle in their own time.”). 
 19 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (examining the 
relationship between expressive rights and racial equality). 
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systematically connected the relational dots.  In particular, scholars have 
neither identified nor explained the wide-ranging process in which rights 
intersect and associate with one another over time.  Rights Dynamism is a 
step in the direction of addressing this shortcoming. 
As legal constructs, most constitutional rights share deep historical con-
nections.  Some even intersected during pre-ratification and ratification 
eras.  However, the primary focus in this Article will be the modern era of 
constitutional adjudication—roughly the middle of the twentieth century to 
the present.  During that era, rights first began to intersect on a frequent 
basis.  This occurred as a result of the actions and strategic choices of liti-
gants, social movements, and other actors who presented a wide variety of 
cumulative, alternative, aggregate, and hybrid rights claims in constitution-
al cases.20  They sometimes  strategically invoked particular constitutional 
rights, such as freedom of speech, in order to facilitate recognition of equal 
protection and other rights.21  As a result of these actions, courts were called 
upon to adjudicate and interpret at the intersections of constitutional rights.  
They had to make choices concerning which, if any, alternative constitu-
tional rights claims to recognize or uphold.  In the process of doing so, 
courts elaborated not just individual rights and remedies, but also the rela-
tionship between and sometimes among different constitutional rights. 
Although it takes place most regularly and principally in the courts, 
Rights Dynamism also includes non-judicial actors and non-legal influences.  
Thus, governments have enacted laws and policies that have placed consti-
tutional rights in connection or tension with one another.  Scholars have de-
veloped theories concerning rights, and sometimes published commentaries 
on the relationships between and among different rights.  The press reports 
on rights, and the public consumes information about and debates the con-
tours of rights.  These external forces are a less visible but still vital aspect of 
Rights Dynamism.  They too can influence or alter the meanings of consti-
tutional rights as they intersect with and relate to one another. 
Part I of the Article introduces and explains the concept of Rights Dy-
namism.  It examines the relational character of constitutional rights, and 
explains the various ways in which rights provisions can come to intersect 
with one another.  Part I then turns to the mechanics of Rights Dynamism.  
In very broad terms, it identifies the influences that can affect when and 
how rights intersect, and explains how these intersections lead to bi-
directional constitutional elaborations over time. 
Part II examines Rights Dynamism in practice, through three detailed 
examples.  It focuses on three different rights relationships: (1) equal protec-
 
 20 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 at 14. 
 21 See generally KALVEN, supra note 19 (describing civil rights advocates’ strategic reliance on First 
Amendment claims). 
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tion and due process; (2) freedom of expression and equal protection; and (3) 
freedom of expression and free exercise of religion. 22  These constitutional 
relationships have spanned many decades and eras.  Thus, it is not possible 
to identify and discuss all of the details and nuances of their intersections.  
The more limited object in Part II is to provide a general sense of how 
Rights Dynamism works, and how bi-directional elaboration results from 
the dynamic intersection between and sometimes among rights provisions. 
Part III explores the implications of Rights Dynamism for rights, rights-
holders, and the study of rights.  It offers a critical assessment of Rights Dy-
namism, based on the relationships examined in Part II.  The assessment 
makes three general points.  First, we ought to reconsider our perspective 
regarding “individual” rights.  Many constitutional rights are actively rela-
tional—they ought to be conceptualized, taught, studied, and discussed as 
relational constructs, rather than as isolated individual protections.23  Se-
cond, notwithstanding their relational character, it is important to maintain 
some conceptual and enforcement space between constitutional rights pro-
visions.  This separation helps to prevent rights subjugation (the dominance 
of one right by another) and rights redundancy (the treatment of constitu-
tional text as redundant or meaningless).  Third, and relatedly, we ought to 
work toward the goal of having a healthy and collaborative rights pluralism.  
As Obergefell and other examples show, constitutional rights are infinitely 
stronger and more liberty-enhancing when they can be invoked and en-
gaged in collaborative and synergistic relationships.  Part III concludes by 
identifying some additional rights relationships whose examination could 
further our understanding of Rights Dynamism and its relationship to con-
stitutional construction. 
I.  RIGHTS RELATIONSHIPS AND RIGHTS DYNAMICS 
This Part introduces and explains the concept of Rights Dynamism.  It 
begins by highlighting the relational nature of constitutional rights.  The 
Part then describes and explains the general process of Rights Dynamism, 
 
 22 References in the Article to “expressive” rights generally include not only freedom of speech but 
also related rights including freedom of association and freedom of press.  The terminology re-
flects the Supreme Court’s treatment of these and other First Amendment rights as related to, an-
cillary to, or subsumed by the Free Speech Clause.  Some scholars have been highly critical of this 
interpretation.  See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY (2012); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: 
SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR 
A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES (2012); Sonja R. West, First Amendment Neighbors, 66 ALA. L. REV. 
357 (2014).  The Article’s usage reflects the Court’s current characterization of the constellation of 
First Amendment rights that are related to or protect “expression.” 
 23 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1072 (claiming that as a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court has 
often combined constitutional clauses—including rights provisions—in order to dispose of cases).  
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and its relationship to constitutional interpretation. 
A.  Rights as Relational 
Constitutional rights are individual rights, in the fundamental sense that 
they belong to individual persons and protect personal interests.24  Howev-
er, constitutional rights do not exist in strict isolation from one another.  To 
the contrary, they are connected by thick historical, precedential, and doc-
trinal tissues.25  From inception to maturity, rights relate, associate, and in-
tersect in a variety of interesting and dynamic ways.  Their relationships 
profoundly shape and influence our understandings of individual rights and 
constitutional liberty more generally. 
First, constitutional rights are connected by virtue of their common ori-
gins and shared histories.  The rights in the Bill of Rights were subject to 
debate, adoption, and ratification through the same democratic processes—
the “original” Rights Dynamism, one might say.  Proponents of subsequent 
amendments relied on some of these original guarantees to gain recognition 
for new rights.  For example, with regard to constitutional equality, Recon-
struction Republicans vigorously resisted restrictions on freedom of speech 
and freedom of press that they knew would interfere with the recognition 
and exercise of racial equality rights.26  The Fourteenth Amendment was 
later invoked to “incorporate” almost all of the Bill of Rights against states 
and localities.27  In these and other respects, rights provisions have been 
closely and indelibly connected from inception. 
Second, although individual rights are freestanding provisions, they also 
overlap in terms of their substantive protections.  This is true, for example, 
of all of the First Amendment’s expressive guarantees—freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, the right to peaceable assembly, the right to petition 
government for redress of grievances, and the right of association.28  Free-
dom of speech and the free exercise of religion are distinctive rights, but 
they share a common core that protects freedom of conscience, belief, and 
expression.29  Fourteenth Amendment due process and equality rights both 
 
 24 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995) (describing equal protec-
tion as a “personal” right). 
 25 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 14, at 237 (explaining how subsequent amendments relating to the 
right to vote, including the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments, “interact 
with” the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 26 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 235 (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned 
and invoked expressive rights in debates). 
 27 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating that the Free Speech Clause was 
part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 28 See Bhagwat, supra note 1 (observing that expressive rights are connected by a common concern 
with democratic participation). 
 29 Cf. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. 
REV. 545 (1983). 
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protect against the threat of caste legislation.30  Fourth Amendment and 
First Amendment rights protect a zone of privacy that limits governmental 
intrusions into certain intimate matters.31  Partly as a result of their shared 
cores, rights provisions can frame, facilitate, and illuminate one another. 
Third, in terms of application and enforcement, constitutional rights 
have been brought into close and dynamic contact with one another.  Once 
most of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights had been incorporated against 
the states, litigants, activists, and social movements increasingly relied on 
these provisions to remedy constitutional wrongs.  Since their meanings 
were not firmly established, litigants frequently invoked multiple constitu-
tional guarantees in search of a constitutional remedy.  These cumulative 
and aggregated claims pushed different constitutional rights into direct con-
tact with one another.32 
Thus, for example, during the 1930s and 1940s, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
who challenged restrictions on public proselytizing and solicitation invoked 
the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free Press 
Clause.33  In early challenges to social and economic regulations, litigants 
frequently relied on both Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due 
process claims.34  Similarly, for many decades, speakers challenging re-
strictions on expressive activity have relied on both the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Free Speech Clause.35  Criminal defendants also began to 
accumulate or aggregate due process and Sixth Amendment ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claims, in search of an effective remedy.36  In some of 
these cases, the Supreme Court expressly relied on more than one constitu-
tional right to reach its decision.  In others, the Court’s treatment of one 
rights provision indirectly affected others.  In all of these instances, the 
Court was part of an ongoing process that helped to establish and define 
relationships between and among rights.  
Fourth, constitutional claimants have sometimes invoked one individual 
right to gain recognition for, or to facilitate the effective exercise of, another 
 
 30 See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 222 (explaining that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
originally intended to prohibit caste legislation). 
 31 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (articulating a “penumbral” approach to 
privacy that relied on a number of different individual rights, including First Amendment rights). 
 32 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1078–82 (discussing some examples of rights combinations in Su-
preme Court cases). 
 33 See generally Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 
133 (1993) (examining the Hughes Court decisions of the 1930s and 1940s, which elaborated on 
free speech, free press, and free exercise rights). 
 34 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (raising both due process and 
equal protection challenges to municipal ordinance that restricted commercial advertising). 
 35 See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (invalidating restriction on 
picketing near schools under Equal Protection Clause). 
 36 See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2 (observing that due process and right to legal counsel provi-
sions can operate in this way). 
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right.  The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause has served this function 
with regard to a number of constitutional rights, including equal protection 
and free exercise of religion.37  Similarly, Second Amendment proponents 
have invoked privacy rights to secure the right to bear arms.38  In these con-
texts, a right can be used instrumentally to contribute to the recognition or 
enforcement of some other right. 
Fifth, through laws, regulations, and official expression, government ac-
tors sometimes bring different rights provisions into contact with one an-
other.  For example, a legislature might regulate the speech of physicians in 
order to protect patients’ Second Amendment rights.39  Or it might seek to 
influence the exercise of abortion rights by requiring that physicians dis-
close certain information to women who seek abortions.40  These and other 
regulations of “rights speech”—communications about or concerning the 
recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights—bring different con-
stitutional rights into contact with one another.41 
Sixth, two or more rights-holders may bring constitutional rights into di-
rect or indirect conflict with one another.  For example, free speech rights 
may conflict with privacy rights or voting rights.42  The Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial might conflict with First Amendment free press rights.43  
Rights conflicts can also arise when parties invoke constitutional rights in a 
defensive or exclusionary manner.  For example, judicial enforcement of 
First Amendment freedom of association or free exercise rights can negative-
ly affect constitutional equality rights.44  In these instances, courts sometimes 
weigh or balance two conflicting constitutional rights against one another.45 
 
 37 See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 19 (discussing the use of free speech claims to advance the civil rights 
equality agenda). 
 38 See Zick, supra note 2, at 27–28 (discussing Second Amendment privacy claims). 
 39 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding provision 
prohibiting physicians from asking patients about firearms ownership unless medically appropri-
ate). 
 40 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion) (up-
holding compelled abortion disclosure provision). 
 41 See Zick, supra note 2, at 41–55 (discussing the constitutional implications of rights speech regula-
tions). 
 42 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (holding that privacy interest in contents of 
private conversation gave way to public interest in dissemination of information of public con-
cern); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840–42 (1995) (holding 
provision of student funds to Christian publication did not violate Establishment Clause); Burson 
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding limits on campaign speech 
near polls). 
 43 See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1976) (noting that free press and fair trial 
rights sometimes clash, and that press has an obligation to safeguard the fairness of trial proceed-
ings). 
 44 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (invalidating anti-discrimination 
provision as applied to group that rejected homosexual members as part of its expressive mes-
sage). 
 45 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. 
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Thus far, we have been considering rights primarily in pairings or dyads.  
However, sometimes more than two constitutional rights provisions actively 
intersect.  Thus, as noted, during the 1930s and 1940s, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
invoked the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Free 
Press Clause to challenge restrictions on public activities.  In some contexts, 
freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and the Establishment Clause 
may also be implicated by the same set of facts.46  Thus, rights relationships 
may involve intersections among more than two constitutional provisions. 
In terms of history, substance, and application, many constitutional 
rights provisions have intersected and matured together in the various ways 
just suggested.  As the Supreme Court recently recognized, these kinds of 
intersections continue to inform the recognition, enforcement, and interpre-
tation of constitutional rights. 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that the right to marriage equality 
implicates both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.47  It 
explained that the two clauses are “connected in a profound way, though they 
set forth independent principles.”48  The Court elaborated on the relationship: 
In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of 
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two 
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.  This 
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what free-
dom is and must become.49 
The Court’s observations apply to many individual guarantees.  Free-
dom of speech and equal protection provide overlapping but distinctive 
coverage for expressive activities.  For decades, courts relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause to invalidate content-discriminatory laws and regula-
tions.50  Free speech and equal protection “converge” and interrelate in a 
way that illuminates both the individual rights and their relationship. 
Freedom of speech and (substantive) due process provide overlapping 
protection for individual thoughts, and a zone of freedom of intimate and 
expressive activities.51  In any particular case, the privacy right or free 
speech right may best capture the “essence of the right.”  However, the in-
terrelation of the two “furthers our understanding of what freedom is and 
 
ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996) (discussing rights balancing). 
 46 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (invalidating exclusion of religious publication from student 
activity funding program, and rejecting claim that inclusion of publication would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause). 
 47 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
 48 Id. at 2603. 
 49 Id. (citations omitted). 
 50 See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (invalidating restriction on 
picketing near schools under Equal Protection Clause). 
 51 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.  
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct.”). 
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must become.”  Another way of articulating the connection is to say that 
expressive rights, in particular freedom of speech, are essential to a fully re-
alized right to privacy.  At the same time, privacy rights protect important 
interests that facilitate and elaborate free speech rights.  For example, they 
protect an “intellectual privacy” that prohibits government from interfering 
with the private accumulation of knowledge.52 
As discussed further in Part II, the Free Speech Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause interact in a similar manner.53  In many contexts, either 
right might be implicated by governmental action.  For instance, religious 
expression and religious practices may both be covered by either provi-
sion.54  In some contexts, these two clauses may “converge” with regard to 
the identification and definition of the right in question.  However, this in-
tersection of rights can provide a better and fuller understanding “of what 
freedom is and must become.” 
In sum, constitutional rights intersect frequently, and in many different 
ways.  Although not every constitutional right is actively relational in this 
sense, many fundamental rights are.  At the very least, most rights provi-
sions share a common history.  Many overlap in terms of their core cover-
ages.  As well, rights often facilitate and illuminate one another—they influ-
ence each other’s recognition, scope, and enforcement.  Constitutional 
rights can also combine, conjoin, and conflict.  Far from being isolated 
guarantees, rights are part of a system of dynamic and ongoing intersection 
and elaboration.  That system is reflected in, but not confined to, constitu-
tional adjudication and rights doctrines.  As I explain below, Rights Dyna-
mism is a multi-facted and multi-actor enterprise.  
B.  Rights Dynamics 
The right to marriage equality recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges did not 
arise overnight.  In fact, the equal protection-due process right is the prod-
uct of decades of interactions—in courts, scholarship, and public debate—
concerning the relationship between equal protection and due process as 
they relate to marriage.55 
The process in which constitutional rights intersect and relate to one 
another has not received adequate scholarly or judicial attention.56  This 
 
 52 See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 73–74 (2015). 
 53 See infra Part II.C. 
 54 See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (involving a 
free speech and free exercise challenge to a rule that restricted the practice of Sankirtan, a form of 
religious proselytizing). 
 55 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 8 (discussing the jurisprudential journey relating to the right to mar-
riage equality). 
 56 This is beginning to change.  See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2; Coenen, supra note 2. 
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Section outlines the process in general terms.  Part II examines the process 
as it relates to three exemplary rights relationships.  I refer to the general 
process of intersection as “Rights Dynamism.” 
As explained earlier, Rights Dynamism shares some conceptual space 
with certain existing methods of constitutional adjudication and interpreta-
tion—in particular, intratextualism, common law constitutional interpreta-
tion, and living originalism.57  Studies of social and constitutional move-
ments are also relevant to the process by which rights intersect with one 
another.58  In general, these approaches or schools of thought acknowledge 
the relational and evolutionary character of constitutional rights.  Together, 
they provide a theoretical backbone for Rights Dynamism. 
However, Rights Dynamism is distinctive from these theories and tradi-
tions, as well as from the study of social and constitutional movements.  
Thus, Rights Dynamism is not a means of interpreting the Constitution, or 
a framework for interpreting its text in some holistic fashion.  Rather, 
Rights Dynamism focuses on the relational dynamics between and some-
times among constitutional rights provisions.  It highlights and examines a 
distinct, active, dynamic process in which the meanings of rights are elabo-
rated over time.  Lawyers, activists, judges, reporters, civic institutions, and 
constitutional movements are all part of this process. 
As suggested earlier, all rights relationships, have an origination point—a 
time, we might say, when the provisions were formally “introduced” to one 
another for the first time.  As I have already noted, we can trace the beginning 
of a rights relationship or association back to the origins of individual guaran-
tees.  Indeed, even pre-ratification events and influences can be part of the dy-
namic process by which rights intersect with one another.  For instance, the 
relationship between free exercise of religion and freedom of speech began 
well before the First Amendment was proposed or ratified.59  Similarly, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process provisions can 
both be traced to a pre-ratification concern with the evils of caste legislation.60 
Rights Dynamism does not exclude or ignore the original or historic as-
pects of the relational process.  Indeed, early interactions in debates and 
other contexts inform our understanding of intersecting individual rights 
and the process of intersection.  Historical interactions are an important 
 
 57 See sources cited supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 58 See sources cited supra note 14. 
 59 See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) 
(noting the connection between early struggles to publish religious tracts and freedom of the 
press); John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 415, 
416–7 (1989) (“There was a long British Puritan history, from the age of Milton to the 1689 Bill of 
Rights, in the course of which the civil freedoms of speech, press, and assembly arose out of reli-
gious agitation, not the other way round.”). 
 60 See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 222. 
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part of the dynamic process in which rights are recognized, defined, and 
ultimately enforced.  However, although it includes historical interactions 
and original influences, Rights Dynamism is primarily concerned with in-
teractions that post-date the ratification of individual rights provisions—
and, indeed, with their dynamic intersection in the past six decades or so. 
There are two primary reasons for this focus.  First, the process of rec-
ognizing, defining, and actually applying provisions in the Bill of Rights did 
not begin in earnest until after—in some cases, well after—formal ratifica-
tion.61  As a result, most of the “action” in Rights Dynamism has occurred 
during the modern era.62  Second, one of the primary goals for the study of 
Rights Dynamism is to better understand how contemporary understandings 
of constitutional rights are influenced by relational concerns.  These mod-
ern influences are informed by historical materials and events.  However, 
evolutionary and common law interpretation have been more important to 
contemporary understandings of constitutional rights such as freedom of 
speech, equal protection, and the free exercise of religion.63  In sum, the 
process in which rights intersect involves myriad influences that include but 
extend well beyond original materials and understandings.64 
In the most general terms, Rights Dynamism begins when government 
action implicates more than a single constitutional right.  In response and in 
search of effective relief, activists and litigants invoke multiple rights provi-
sions.  Activists and litigants repeatedly make strategic choices to couple, ac-
cumulate, or aggregate rights claims.  These decisions, which are themselves 
influenced by a variety of social, political, and legal factors, initiate a dynam-
ic relationship between and sometimes among constitutional rights.  Cumu-
lative, aggregative, and other constitutional claims connect rights provisions 
to and with one another.  They initiate the process in which rights interact 
and by which their meanings will be debated and constructed. 
This process, which occurs over the course of many decades, is active, 
iterative, and perpetual.  Activists and litigants, many of them repeat play-
ers, rely on precedents established by their predecessors.  For example, Af-
rican-Americans benefitted from very early free speech precedents obtained 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses.65  Later, gay men and lesbians benefitted signifi-
 
 61 See generally AMAR, supra note 17. 
 62 See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 53 (“The central principles of the American system of freedom 
of expression . . . are not the product of a moment of inspired constitutional genius 200-plus years 
ago.  We owe those principles, instead, to the living, common law Constitution.”). 
 63 See id. at 62 (observing that the process of interpreting freedom of speech principles “developed 
over fifty years, often through trial and error”).  See also BALKIN, supra note 14, at 229 (“Inter-
preting the equal protection clause today means interpreting it after the New Deal, after the civil 
rights revolution, and after the second wave of American feminism.”). 
 64 See BALKIN, supra note 14 (observing that constitutional rights evolve in a broad-ranging process 
that includes original understandings, common law elaboration, and public debate). 
 65 See generally Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the 
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cantly from the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment precedents 
secured by African-Americans.66 
Activists and litigants may also seek to alter the understanding of previ-
ously established rights relationships.  Moreover, new social and constitu-
tional movements can arise, during which multiple constitutional rights 
provisions may be relied upon in distinctive ways.  
As noted earlier, rights can also come into conflict or tension with one 
another.  This occurs when rights-holders make separate rights-based 
claims, necessitating some balance or other resolution.  This process is lim-
ited only by the creative energies and talents of activists, litigants, and other 
actors in the system.  It is perpetual in the sense that rights relationships can 
change over time in response to new invocations, strategies, and theories.  
New rights associations may form, and new understandings of constitution-
al rights—both in individual and relational terms—continually develop. 
Thus far I have focused on activists and litigants as primary actors in 
Rights Dynamism.  Owing to their central interpretive function, courts obvi-
ously play a central role.  They react to and adjudicate litigants’ constitutional 
rights claims.  In early test cases, courts must distinguish between or among 
constitutional rights—free speech and free exercise of religion, for example, or 
equal protection and due process.  Through this process, courts sift through 
multiple rights claims.  As explained further below, they define and interpret 
the scope and contours of both individual rights and rights relationships.  
Rights Dynamism is influenced by a wide variety of actors and influ-
ences, which determine whether and how rights interact with one another.  
Thus, as noted earlier, through their official acts government officials can 
bring rights into contact with one another.  Political officials also participate 
in discourses in which they associate or combine constitutional rights.  
Thus, government officials who favor strong protection of the right to bear 
arms might rely on a combination of Second Amendment, First Amend-
ment, privacy, and property arguments.67  Legislative and other officials 
who support abortion rights rely on due process, privacy, and equality-
based arguments, while officials who oppose any extension of abortion 
rights rely on due process, equality, and free speech rights.  Like litigants, 
political officials sometimes discuss constitutional rights in the aggregate, in 
the alternative, or as conflicting guarantees. 
Social discourse regarding constitutional rights can also exhibit some of 
these same characteristics.  Media outlets and the public at large discuss 
 
Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2006) (discuss-
ing Jehovah’s Witnesses free speech precedents). 
 66 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 99–
100 (1999) (discussing LGBT movement’s reliance on civil rights First Amendment precedents). 
 67 See Zick, supra note 2, at 29–36 (discussing non-Second Amendment protections relating to arms). 
May 2017] RIGHTS DYNAMISM 805 
and debate the tensions between freedom of expression and equality, priva-
cy and the right to bear arms, and free exercise of religion and equality.  As 
some commentators noted in the aftermath of the shooting death of Mi-
chael Brown, press coverage and public debates seemed to focus myopically 
on First Amendment expressive rights rather than other rights allegedly be-
ing violated in Ferguson, Missouri.68  This sort of reporting can reflect or 
affect the public’s perspective regarding the hierarchy of different rights.  
Scholars also participate in, and sometimes significantly affect, rights dy-
namics.  Despite the relative lack of attention to Rights Dynamism, constitu-
tional scholars have commented on particular rights relationships.  For ex-
ample, some have offered substantive theories regarding the relationships 
between free speech and free exercise, free speech and equality, and due pro-
cess and equal protection.69  This work has contributed to judicial and public 
understandings of the relationship between and among constitutional rights.70 
In Rights Dynamism, the various players and participants can some-
times influence one another.  Academic commentary regarding the rela-
tional aspects of constitutional rights can affect litigants’ strategic choices as 
well as judicial interpretations and case outcomes.  New theories and com-
mentaries can lead to changes in the interpretation of rights relationships, 
or to further illumination of these relationships.  Of course, it is not possible 
to establish causal relationships.  However, the process suggests that these 
influences are indeed present.  For example, prior to and during the civil 
rights movement, academic commentary on free speech rights may have 
affected litigants’ and the Supreme Court’s perception of the relationship 
between freedom of expression and racial equality.71  Similarly, long before 
Justice Kennedy discussed the illuminating relationship between due pro-
cess and equality rights in Obergefell, constitutional scholars had already 
identified and discussed it.72 
In sum, Rights Dynamism is a broad and inclusive process that involves 
litigation, adjudication, public discourse, and scholarly commentary con-
 
 68 See Dahlia Lithwick & Daria Roithmayr, Ferguson’s Constitutional Crisis, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/ferguson_s_ 
  constitutional_crisis_first_amendment_violations_are_only_part.html (lamenting lack of coverage 
of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations). 
 69 See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992) (explaining 
how law banning sodomy demonstrates link between substantive due process and equal protec-
tion); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (claiming that substantive due process is a 
retrospective analysis, whereas equal protection is forward-looking). 
 70 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 4, at 474–75 (describing scholars’ contributions to the shift in LGBTQ 
cases from the Due Process Clause to the Equal Protection Clause). 
 71 See KALVEN, supra note 19 (examining contemporary civil rights cases in an attempt to clarify the-
oretical basis for free expression). 
 72 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474 (observing that “the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the 
equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other”). 
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cerning the relationships between and among constitutional rights.  Alt-
hough much of the action takes place in the courts, a variety of actors and 
influences participate in the dynamic process of defining and interpreting 
rights and their relationships to one another. 
C.  Dynamic Elaboration 
Over time, the process of Rights Dynamism contributes to the elabora-
tion and construction of individual rights and rights relationships.  Through 
active intersections in which constitutional rights are mashed up, com-
pared, contrasted, and sometimes balanced against one another, partici-
pants influence the meanings of rights both independently and in relation 
to one another. 
In general, the elaborative process occurs over many decades and results 
from multiple rights interactions.  As illustrated in Part II, as litigants invoke 
and rely upon individual rights provisions in various contexts and for a varie-
ty of purposes, courts interpret and elaborate the meanings of individual 
rights guarantees and the relationships between and sometimes among them. 
Dynamic elaboration does not fully establish the meaning of any partic-
ular constitutional right or rights relationship.  However, it can significantly 
affect the interpretation and meaning of constitutional rights.  It is thus an 
integral part of the interpretive and constructive process.  
With regard to many constitutional rights, meaning is derived not solely 
from individual text, history, and applications, but also from intersections 
and relationships between and sometimes among rights.  Through this in-
teractive process, courts and officials do more than shape the meaning of 
individual rights provisions.  As they adjudicate and interpret at the inter-
section of freedom of expression and equality, freedom of expression and 
free exercise, equal protection and equality, etc., officials establish, influ-
ence, and define rights relationships. 
As is true of Rights Dynamism, dynamic elaboration is primarily—
though again not exclusively—the province of courts.  When deciding cases 
at the intersection of neighboring, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting 
rights provisions, courts must often make difficult choices regarding (1) 
which claims to recognize or disfavor; (2) whether, and if so how, to com-
bine constitutional rights or relate them to one another; and (3) the proper 
resolution of tensions and conflicts between constitutional rights. 
As they answer these questions, courts do not generally discuss rights in 
explicitly relational terms.73  Obergefell, in which the Supreme Court high-
lighted aspects of the relationship between due process and equal protection 
 
 73 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1069 (observing that the Supreme Court generally segregates rights 
provisions and constitutional doctrines). 
May 2017] RIGHTS DYNAMISM 807 
rights, is a notable exception.74  Nevertheless, even if they do not articulate 
their decisions in relational or cumulative terms, courts are engaged in a 
process of dynamic interpretation.  When they adjudicate cumulative, ag-
gregate, and other types of claims involving multiple rights, courts construct 
the meanings of individual rights in relation to one another.  They illumi-
nate, clarify, and sometimes unsettle rights relationships. 
As noted, this elaborative process occurs over many decades.  It involves 
adjudication of numerous controversies in which the subject rights intersect 
with one another.  Moreover, like Rights Dynamism itself, dynamic inter-
pretation continues in perpetuity.  As activists and parties invoke rights, 
courts can return to specific intersections as new issues arise.  They can af-
firm or alter the interpretation of rights and their relationships with one an-
other.  However, they can also leave things unsettled, thus providing liti-
gants with future opportunities to combine or contrast rights provisions. 
For the most part, the actual mechanics of dynamic interpretation are 
familiar to common law constitutional adjudication.  Courts obviously rely 
on ordinary inputs such as briefs, amicus filings, and factual records.  How-
ever, dynamic interpretation involves a complicating set of factors and in-
fluences.  Cross-doctrinal developments and considerations play a larger 
and more important role in dynamic interpretation than they do in ordi-
nary adjudication of individual rights claims.  When courts actively engage 
with more than one rights provision at a time, the interpretive enterprise 
requires at least implicit recognition of doctrinal effects in more than one 
area.  Even if courts do not consciously consider these effects, their deci-
sions will often cross doctrinal boundaries. 
For example, as explained below, in cases where Free Speech Clause 
and Free Exercise Clause claims are brought together, developments in both 
the free speech and religious liberty areas can impact the interpretive en-
terprise.75  Courts interpreting the speech rights of religious adherents must 
at least be mindful or aware of changes to free exercise doctrines.  They 
may interpret free speech rights in response to those changes, or owing to 
concerns about them.  Similarly, as I also discuss below, changing notions 
of constitutional equality can influence judicial interpretation of expressive 
rights—and vice versa.76  Courts may expand free speech rights in order to 
facilitate equal protection rights, or may interpret free speech claims in light 
of changes in equal protection doctrine.  At intersection points, courts do 
 
 74 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (discussing due process and equal protec-
tion components of the marital right).  For other examples of explicitly cumulative reasoning in 
rights cases, see Coenen, supra note 2, at 1078–82. 
 75 See discussion infra, Part II.C (arguing that the intersection of freedom of speech and free exercise 
of religion has influenced the court’s concepts, doctrines, and principles). 
 76 See discussion infra, Part II.B (recounting significant events in civil rights movements that influ-
enced the Court’s identification of certain rights). 
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not and indeed cannot always focus on singular constitutional provisions or 
doctrines.  Rather, they are engaged in an elaborative process that impli-
cates more than one right. 
Other distinctive concerns arise when courts engage in dynamic elabo-
ration.  When courts adjudicate more than one right at a time, or when one 
right is used to facilitate another, the specter of constitutional balancing or 
trading rights off against one another can arise.  For instance, when they 
hear cases concerning free speech rights near abortion clinics, judges might 
be influenced by perceptions of the relative strength or worth of rights such 
as freedom of speech or abortion.77  When confronted with a tension or 
conflict between constitutional rights such as privacy and free speech, or 
free speech and free exercise, judges may confront similar tensions or con-
flicts.  These can influence adjudication in situations where rights are pre-
sented in the alternative, or facilitate one another, or conflict. 
Of course, as in other contexts, courts adjudicating cumulative or ag-
gregate rights claims are subject to certain external influences.  For in-
stance, judicial receptivity to certain rights claims might be affected by 
changes in official or public attitudes regarding particular claimants or 
rights claims.  Increased public recognition and support for a constitutional 
right may affect how that right is viewed not merely in isolation, but also in 
relation to other constitutional rights.  At the same time, a decrease in sup-
port for a right, or sustained public conflicts regarding a particular right, 
may weaken its position vis-à-vis other rights. 
For example, as discussed further below, the Supreme Court was initially 
more receptive to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Free Speech Clause claims than their 
Free Exercise Clause claims.78  Some have argued that the Court’s prefer-
ence for free speech over free exercise was related to significant changes in 
the American political system and Supreme Court Justices’ personal biases 
regarding the constitutional claims of adherents to minority religions.79  
To take a more recent example, for many decades courts were more in-
clined to recognize free expression rights on behalf of LGBT claimants than 
 
 77 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend the Speech They 
Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment 11–12 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107425 (discussing whether judges favor 
litigants who share similar political or ideological commitments); Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. Le-
Blanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need 
for an Objective Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 198–99 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court sometimes favors anti-abortion speech). 
 78 See infra Part II.C (finding that the first few Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cases did not even address the 
free exercise claims). 
 79 See Feldman, supra note 65, at 474–75 (arguing that the development of a pluralistic democracy 
led to the favoring of free expression over religious freedom with the help of a protestant-
controlled Supreme Court); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 67–70 (discussing the external influ-
ences that shaped modern free speech principles). 
May 2017] RIGHTS DYNAMISM 809 
substantive equality claims.80  Only after public attitudes regarding sexual 
orientation and sexual orientation equality changed dramatically—in part 
as a consequence of robust exercise of First Amendment rights of speech 
and association—did courts begin to recognize substantive LGBT equality 
and privacy rights.81 
Like other forms of common law adjudication, the dynamic elaboration 
of individual rights is not linear—it does not progress in some sequential or 
orderly manner.  Indeed, owing in part to the involvement of more than 
one right, dynamic elaboration may be even more reactive, unintentional, 
and unpredictable than common law counterparts. 
The results or products of dynamic interpretation bear these observa-
tions out.  There are myriad possibilities.  For instance, the elaborative pro-
cess might be truncated or short-circuited.  Consider in this regard the pre-
sent understanding of the relationship between the Free Speech Clause and 
other First Amendment rights—assembly, petition, press, and association.  
The Supreme Court has effectively merged all of these neighboring guaran-
tees with the Free Speech Clause.82  That interpretation is not necessarily 
settled for all time.  As part of the process of Rights Dynamism, scholars are 
actively re-examining these relationships—toward the end of convincing 
courts to independently interpret and enforce these rights.83  But right now, 
there are few opportunities for doctrinal dynamics to develop between and 
among these First Amendment provisions. 
The fate of the Free Speech Clause’s immediate neighbors demon-
strates that one right may ultimately be subjugated to another.  Dynamic 
elaboration can potentially create rights redundancies, such that one right 
no longer serves any special or distinctive purpose.  In the most extreme 
case, one right in a rights relationship may totally succumb to another and 
cease to have any independent meaning.84 
 
 80 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 98–137 (discussing early cases involving speech, association, and 
press). 
 81 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563–78 (2003) (overruling prior precedent that allowed 
governments to punish homosexual sodomy); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 
(2013) (invalidating federal Defense of Marriage Act on due process and equal protection 
grounds). 
 82 See Bhagwat, supra note 1, at 1098–99 (“The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, 
and Petition Clauses—might as well not exist.”); INAZU, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that there is 
good reason to think that the right to freedom of association has been subsumed into the blanket 
freedom of speech provision); KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 22, at 158 (discussing Supreme Court 
cases that decide issues that would theoretically fit under the Petition Clause under the Free 
Speech Clause); West, supra note 22, at 358 (finding that the Free Speech Clause has received sig-
nificant attention while the freedom of the press has been largely ignored). 
 83 See generally Bhagwat, supra note 1; INAZU, supra note 22; KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 22; West, 
supra note 22. 
 84 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71 (2001) (discuss-
ing relationship between the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause). 
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More typically, active intersection affects the meanings of individual 
rights in relation to one another.85  As the Supreme Court suggested in 
Obergefell, constitutional rights may be interpreted such that they illuminate 
or clarify one another.86  There the Court engaged in what Professor Mi-
chael Coenen recently described as “combination analysis”—the explicit 
justification of outcomes by reference to multiple rights provisions acting 
together.87  Of course, rights do not always or necessarily support one an-
other when adjudicated together.  Rights provisions may also be interpret-
ed in ways that complicate, restrict, or even undermine one another.88  
As a result of their various couplings and interactions, constitutional 
rights can also combine with one another in unique and sometimes con-
founding ways.  For example, so-called “hybrid” rights conjoin two rights in 
a manner that seemingly produces a viable claim where one based on either 
right alone might fail.  Thus, the Supreme Court has indicated that where-
as a stand-alone Free Exercise Clause claim might fail, a “hybrid” claim in-
volving free exercise and another right—such as the right to privacy or 
freedom of speech—might succeed.89  
Since dynamic interpretation cuts across two—and sometimes more—
constitutional provisions, these resulting elaborations are typically bi- or 
multi-directional.  Thus, when they intersect, the meanings of both freedom 
of expression and constitutional equality, both freedom of expression and 
free exercise, and both equal protection and due process can be affected.  
In the elaborative process, rights in active relation both influence and are 
influenced by one another. 
This is why, to varying degrees, contemporary understandings and in-
terpretations of constitutional rights are a function of their relationships to 
other rights.  Thus, the meaning of the modern Equal Protection Clause is 
derived in part from its interactions with the Due Process Clause.  Similar-
ly, current understandings of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause 
are, in part, a function of their frequent and dynamic intersection with the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The contemporary meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause is linked to its interactions with the Free Speech Clause.  As to all of 
these pairings, we can also say “vice versa”—the elaborative influence gen-
erally runs in both directions. 
 
 85 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 4 (examining relationship between the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 86 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (discussing relationship between the 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause as it relates to marriage). 
 87 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1075–77 (explaining the concept of combination analysis). 
 88 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 480–83 (suggesting that Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause have sometimes limited one another’s scope). 
 89 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (recognizing the “hybrid” constitutional 
claim).  See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990) (criticizing the concept of “hybrid” rights). 
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Dynamic elaboration supplements our understanding of constitutional 
interpretation.  It helps to illuminate the processes by which constitutional 
rights are subject to change.  Along with original understandings, prece-
dents, and other sources of constitutional meaning, dynamic elaboration 
contributes something important to the interpretive enterprise.  As rights in-
teract and socialize over extended periods of time, constitutional rights pro-
visions can take on narrower, broader, or even distinctive new meanings. 
II.  EXAMPLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Part I discussed the relational nature of constitutional rights and de-
scribed the dynamic processes in which rights intersect and are interpreted.  
Part II uses three rights relationships as examples and illustrations.  Rather 
than examine all of the details relating to each rights relationship, the object 
is to show in broad terms how Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration 
operate.  The first relationship considered is that between the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its Equal Protection Clause.90  Ober-
gefell is one product of the dynamic intersection of these clauses.  However, 
it is only a single decision point in a long and complex relationship.  The 
other two examples involve the Free Speech Clause and its intersection 
with other constitutional rights—namely, the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The object is not merely to describe the relation-
ships, but rather to analyze the rights interactions and critically assess the 
processes and products of dynamic elaboration. 
A.  Due Process and Equal Protection 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court relied on the synergistic con-
nections between the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
to recognize a right to marriage for gay men and lesbians.91  Obergefell was a 
culmination point in a dynamic process that began at the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framing and involved many decades of activism, litigation, 
doctrinal change, public debate, governmental action, and scholarly exam-
ination.  This initial illustration briefly highlights some of the general as-
pects of Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration.  The two other rights 
relationships are considered in greater detail. 
 
 90 The discussion in this Part is limited to the substantive aspects of these guarantees, and does not 
consider their procedural dimensions. 
 91 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (discussing relationship between Due Process Clause and 
Equal Protection Clause as it relates to marriage). 
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1.  From Synergy to Separation 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protec-
tion Clause are close textual neighbors.  Their relationship has deep textual 
and historical roots.  The clauses are intimately connected in terms of their 
framing, ratification, and central purposes. 
As a matter of their original dynamic, the two provisions intersected with 
and illuminated one another.92  As Jack Balkin has observed, “[e]vidence of 
the connection between due process and equality is everywhere in [the] Re-
construction-era debates.”93  As concepts and then later as rights, due process 
and equal protection illuminated one another.  Due process was a fundamen-
tal guarantee that included substantive equality rights.94  Moreover, as Akhil 
Amar has explained, it was understood during early debates that “the Equal 
Protection Clause was in part a clarifying gloss on the due process idea.”95 
From the beginning, at least at a very broad level of abstraction, both 
clauses were about fundamental fairness.  In their substantive dimensions, 
due process and equal protection prohibit governments from taking actions 
that single out, discriminate, or create castes.  They offer important protec-
tions for personal dignity.  This was the understanding before courts engaged 
regularly with the due process and equal protection guarantees in the twenti-
eth century. 
Likely with this understanding, in the modern era litigants frequently in-
voked the due process and equal protection guarantees together or cumula-
tively.  This has occurred in a wide range of contexts, including cases involv-
ing socio-economic regulations, fundamental procreative rights, claims 
relating to access to courts, race discrimination, presidential elections, and 
marriage.96  Due process and equal protection rights have also intersected in 
so-called “fundamental interest” or “substantive equal protection” cases.97  
In these and other cases, litigants sought relief under one or both provisions. 
At the same time, legal scholars have also studied, and in some cases 
sought to influence, the manner in which due process and equal protection 
 
 92 See BALKIN, supra note 14, at 220 (discussing historical overlap between the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses). 
 93 Id. at 251. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Amar, supra note 12, at 772. 
 96 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (noting that both due process and equal 
protection had been invoked in a challenge to mandatory sterilization law, but relying on equal 
protection); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108–10 (1949) (rejecting due process 
and equal protection challenges to an advertising restriction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–
17 (1956) (relying on both due process and equal protection to invalidate denial of transcript for 
indigent defendant in direct appeal); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a ban 
on interracial marriage under both equal protection and due process guarantees). 
 97 See generally Karlan, supra note 4, at 473–82 (examining the relationship between the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause). 
May 2017] RIGHTS DYNAMISM 813 
rights relate to one another.  Some prominent scholarly accounts have em-
phasized the distinctions between due process and equal protection.98  Thus, 
rather than focus on points of overlap or intersection, commentators have 
chosen to emphasize the distinctive characteristics of each right.99  By con-
trast, other influential treatments have sought to integrate or combine the 
two provisions, such that they protect a single right—“equal citizenship,” 
for example.100  However, as Pam Karlan has observed, one of the potential 
pitfalls of this approach is that “[t]he two clauses become, rather than in-
form, one another.”101 
The Supreme Court has never taken a firm side in this debate.  In its 
rulings, the due process-equal protection relationship has rarely been ex-
plicitly recognized or addressed (Obergefell, again, being an obvious excep-
tion).  Despite having ample opportunities to do so, the Court has never 
elaborated a consistent approach to these provisions or a coherent account 
of their relationship to one another. 
In fundamental interest and other special cases, the Court has occasion-
ally relied on both the due process and equal protection provisions—without 
explaining what, if any, relationship they have to one another.102  In Loving 
v. Virginia, which invalidated a state miscegenation law, the Court relied al-
most exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause, but briefly stated at the 
end of the opinion that the law also violated the Due Process Clause.103  
However, far more typically the Court has explained decisions either in 
terms of due process or equal protection.  In general, particularly if one 
looks at its most iconic decisions, the Court has essentially treated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses as fungible provisions.104 
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed separate doctrines relat-
ing to each clause.  Equal protection is now commonly understood to pro-
 
 98 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 475–76 (discussing the work of constitutional scholars). 
 99 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83, 385–86 (1985) (arguing the Court should have used the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to protect abortion rights). 
 100 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1977) (“The substantive core of the [14th] amendment . . . is a principle of equal citi-
zenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by the orga-
nized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.”). 
 101 Karlan, supra note 4, at 475. 
 102 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107, 120 (1996) (invalidating a restriction on access to 
courts under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause).  But see id. at 130 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner requests relief under both the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses, though she does not specify how either Clause affords it.  The majority accedes to 
petitioner’s request.  But . . . the majority does not specify the source of the relief it grants.”).  
 103 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). 
 104 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (relying on the Due Process 
Clause of Fifth Amendment). 
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tect against certain purposeful and invidious governmental classifications.105  
In its substantive aspects, due process protects certain “fundamental” 
rights.106  Thus, modern doctrines segregate two constitutional provisions 
that, at least as an original matter, were closely bound together and acted as 
glosses upon one another. 
Like the other rights pairings, due process and equal protection have a 
long history of active intersection and interaction.  Nevertheless, litigants 
have generally sought relief under one or the other provision, while courts 
and scholars have generally ignored the relational dynamics between the 
clauses.  Little attention has been paid to the manner in which due process 
and equal protection rights have actively intersected with and influenced 
one another over time. 
2.  “Stereoscopic” Elaboration 
As Obergefell shows, due process and equal protection can be mutually il-
luminating guarantees.  Rights Dynamism and the concept of dynamic 
elaboration can help explain how. 
Rights Dynamism suggests that judicial and scholarly accounts of the 
due process-equal protection intersection are missing something important.  
When due process and equal protection are pressed together and mashed 
up over many decades, there are bound to be significant relational and 
elaborative effects.  On closer examination, although they may be subtler in 
this relationship than in those discussed below, the influences are present. 
As Pam Karlan has explained, we can discover these relational dynam-
ics and effects only by viewing due process and equal protection rights “ste-
reoscopically”—i.e., through the lenses of both clauses.107  Thus, instead of 
disaggregating or merging the provisions together, we ought to view these 
rights as dynamically relational.  As Professor Karlan suggests, this ap-
proach reveals that the intersection between due process and equal protec-
tion leads to “synergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might 
reach by itself.”108 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s due process/equal protection 
precedents generally rely on one provision or the other—they disaggregate, 
treating due process and equal protection as parallel, rather than inter-
twined, rights.  However, in some contexts, the Court has developed doc-
 
 105 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining that 
classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin are subject to strict scrutiny). 
 106 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plurality opinion (ex-
plaining the fundamental rights jurisprudence that has developed with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 107 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 474. 
 108 Id. 
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trines that at least implicitly bring the clauses together.  These interactions 
highlight what is unique about rights dynamics and dynamic elaboration. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the right to vote.109  
The decisions have generally been treated as resting on equal protection 
grounds.  However, as Professor Karlan has shown, they are deeply influ-
enced by due process-fundamental rights considerations.110  As mentioned 
earlier, due process doctrines and principles identify the liberties govern-
ment cannot deny its citizens equal access to without compelling justifica-
tion.  The right to vote cases are thus an example of the kind of “innova-
tion” that can occur when two related, but still distinct, clauses are invoked 
and adjudicated together.111  This innovation is a product of dynamic elab-
oration.  It has occurred over many decades, but largely beneath the sur-
face in judicial opinions. 
Rights dynamics can also impose limits on doctrinal innovation.  In deci-
sions involving access to courts, for example, due process principles provide 
positive content to the right of access but simultaneously constrain the scope 
of these access rights by limiting them to “fundamental” interests.112  The 
dynamic process in which rights interact is not a one-way ratchet.  As they 
intersect over time, rights may facilitate and illuminate one another.  But 
they may also impose conceptual and doctrinal constraints on one another. 
What is important is that due process and equal protection have not 
merely converged with one another.  They have actively intersected and 
combined, in ways that have influenced and illuminated each right and their 
relationship to one another.113  Over time, these interactions have partially 
determined the meanings of due process and equal protection.  The product 
of this intersection, particularly in the voting and court access cases, was a 
hybrid construction featuring bi-directional effects.  Due process and equal 
protection sometimes facilitated one another, while in other contexts these 
rights limited one another’s scope and utility.  Only by looking in both direc-
tions, and specifically at the relational dynamics, can we fully understand the 
substance of the due process and equal protection provisions. 
3.  Obergefell as/and Rights Dynamism 
Obergefell v. Hodges is most notable for its marriage equality holding.  
However, it is also a paradigm example of Rights Dynamism and dynamic 
elaboration.  Plaintiffs challenged marriage bans on both due process and 
equal protection grounds.  The Court could have disaggregated these 
 
 109 See id. at 478–80 (discussing right to vote cases). 
 110 Id. at 480. 
 111 Id. at 477. 
 112 See id. at 480–83. 
 113 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996). 
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claims and relied on either rights provision.  Instead, the Obergefell Court 
wrote the following with respect to the relationship between the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s two clauses: 
In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of 
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two 
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.  This 
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what free-
dom is and must become.114 
This passage reflects an understanding of the dynamic relationship be-
tween due process and equal protection.  What lies beneath it is a long histo-
ry of dynamic intersection between these rights.  Obergefell is an example of 
the sort of dynamic elaboration that occurs as a result of Rights Dynamism. 
In a commentary on Obergefell, Professor Kenji Yoshino explains how 
cross-doctrinal developments ultimately “freed” liberty under the Due Process 
Clause, making it possible for the Court to break free of the constraints of 
“substantive due process” doctrine.115  Yoshino also demonstrates how, over 
the course of five decades, the Court’s substantive due process doctrine un-
derwent significant changes in areas ranging from abortion, to rights concern-
ing death, to sexual liberty.  As he observes, scholarly treatments of the due 
process and equal protection guarantees likely contributed to these changes.116 
Rather than criticize the Court for not explicitly recognizing a single 
source for the right to marriage equality, Yoshino defends the Court’s rela-
tional approach.  He explains how the Court’s own conception of the rela-
tionship between due process and equal protection changed over time, such 
that the Court’s marriage equality rationale relied on a conception of liber-
ty that was grounded in both due process and equal protection principles. 
This “synthesis of liberty and equality” is one point in the evolutionary 
process.117  The passage quoted earlier, which emphasizes the convergence 
of liberty and equality and their mutual illumination, was a product of dec-
ades of activism, political and cultural changes, scholarly examination, and 
common law doctrinal development.  The Court’s elaboration of a right to 
“antisubordination liberty,” as Yoshino describes it, is based on the idea 
that due process and equal protection facilitate, illuminate, and in some re-
spects cabin one another.118 
Obergefell marks an important milestone in the relationship between due 
process and equal protection.  The decision adopts and elaborates, alt-
hough in relatively cryptic terms, a relational interpretation of the due pro-
 
 114 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 115 See Yoshino, supra note 8, at 148–71 (2015) (discussing due process doctrine before and after Ober-
gefell). 
 116 See id. at 156–57, 164 (discussing academic “backlash” to narrow conceptions of liberty). 
 117 Id. at 171–72. 
 118 Id. at 174; see also Tribe, supra note 7. 
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cess and equal protection guarantees.  In some respects, that elaboration 
comes full circle—it returns to the framing-era recognition that the clauses 
are distinctive, yet mutually reinforcing. 
As Professor Laurence Tribe argues, “Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential 
achievement is to have tightly wound the double helix of Due Process and 
Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity—and to have located that 
doctrine in a tradition of constitutional interpretation as an exercise in pub-
lic education.”119  As Tribe’s account recognizes, Rights Dynamism is a pro-
cess that involves courts and the larger public—the people, the press, and 
commentators – in a discourse about the evolution of constitutional rights. 
Obergefell will not be the last word with regard to the due process-equal 
protection relationship.  What “antisubordination liberty,” or “equal digni-
ty,” will ultimately become depends on how activists, courts, scholars, and the 
public invoke and interpret fundamental rights and equality in future cases.  
Obergefell is a single, but important, point in a perpetual process in which due 
process and equal protection rights dynamically intersect with one another. 
B.  Freedom of Speech and Equal Protection 
This Section and the next discuss other constitutional rights relation-
ships in somewhat greater detail.  From their first introduction up to the 
present, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause have frequently and actively inter-
sected with one another.120  Activists and litigants have pursued free speech 
claims (as well as right of association and free press claims) in order to facili-
tate a variety of equality movements and agendas.  Litigants have invoked 
free speech and equality guarantees separately, in the alternative, and cu-
mulatively.  Courts and commentators have examined the connections and 
distinctions between free speech and equality rights, and articulated bi-
directional constructions of both. 
1.  Textual and Historical Connections 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was debated, Reconstruction Re-
publicans vigorously resisted restrictions on First Amendment freedom of 
speech and freedom of press rights.  They understood that freedom of 
speech, in particular, was critically important to the recognition and effec-
tive exercise of equal protection rights.121  Like the due process and equal 
protection guarantees, freedom of speech and equal protection were closely 
 
 119 Tribe, supra note 7, at 17. 
 120 I have discussed this relationship at length elsewhere.  See generally Zick, supra note 10. 
 121 See AMAR, supra note 17, at 235 (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned 
and invoked expressive rights in debates). 
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linked from the beginning. 
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to “incorporate” the Free Speech Clause 
and other First Amendment rights.122  Incorporation was itself a dynamic 
process, one that occurred in fits and starts until nearly all of the Bill of 
Rights guarantees had been applied to state and local governments.  This 
second major intersection significantly broadened the scope and potential 
power of the First Amendment’s various provisions.  Owing to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
the First Amendment would be applied not just to the federal government 
but also to states and localities.123 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was ratified so 
that newly freed slaves, and oppressed racial minorities more generally, 
would be protected from discriminatory state action.124  At their respective 
cores, however, freedom of speech and equality rights share a common 
concern with the evil of governmental discrimination.  Both the Free 
Speech Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were enacted so that mi-
norities, outsiders, and dissidents would be protected from political majori-
ties represented by the state. 
These historical and substantive connections have influenced the rela-
tionship between freedom of speech and constitutional equality from the 
beginning.  As these clauses have matured in proximity to one another, 
their meanings and relationship have changed dramatically. 
2.  Facilitative and Cumulative Claims 
As I have indicated, it is not possible to follow each and every twist and 
turn with respect to the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech 
and equal protection.  Painting with broader strokes, however, we can see 
Rights Dynamism at work and trace the general developments in terms of 
dynamic elaboration. 
In the modern era, particularly after the process of incorporation, First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been joined in two 
distinct, but related, ways.  Equality advocates of many stripes have invoked 
First Amendment rights in order to facilitate the recognition and eventual 
enforcement of substantive Equal Protection Clause rights.125  Litigants 
 
 122 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Free Speech Clause and 
Free Press Clause). 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (explaining that the clear and central purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination 
in the States). 
 125 See, e.g., KALVEN, supra note 19 (discussing use of First Amendment expressive claims to facilitate 
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have also invoked these rights cumulatively, demanding relief under either 
or sometimes both guarantees.126 
The first type of invocation, which we can call a facilitative claim, uses 
First Amendment rights as a means of obtaining substantive equality 
rights.127  The primary purpose of invoking the Free Speech Clause is to 
obtain basic protections for the group in terms of rights to speak, publish, 
and associate—in other words, to gain recognition of a right to “equal ex-
pression” or “expressive equality.”128  This hybrid form of right is then used 
to communicate in public, distribute information about minority groups, 
and associate for the purpose of advancing the cause of equality. 
In the second type of invocation, which we can label a cumulative claim, 
activists and litigants invoke both the Free Speech Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause to challenge discriminatory governmental action.  Courts 
must then decide which, if either, constitutional right best “fits” the stated 
claim and whether that specific right has been violated.  In order to do so, 
judges must consider and elaborate the meanings of freedom of speech and 
equal protection.  And they must do so in contexts where the two rights are 
both present and potentially viable sources for constitutional claims. 
Under both approaches, notice that litigants bring First Amendment 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights into close and frequent contact with one 
another.  They seek expressive equality rights, test the boundaries of exist-
ing doctrines under both clauses, and sometimes press for recognition of 
new rights under one or the other.  Facilitative and cumulative claims have 
highlighted overlapping constitutional protections under the clauses.  They 
have also provided courts with countless opportunities to elaborate on the 
meanings of free speech and equal protection, and to consider the relation-
ship between freedom of speech and constitutional equality. 
Facilitative claims have deepened our understanding of the connections 
between First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Religious 
adherents, labor activists, feminists, race equality advocates, and LGBT ac-
tivists have all relied upon First Amendment  rights like freedom of speech, 
association, and press to facilitate equal protection agendas.  In doing so, 
these movements have contributed significantly to a distinctive elaboration 
of the relationship between freedom of expression and equality.  They have 
 
racial equality agenda); Zick, supra note 10 (discussing ways in which African-Americans and 
LGBT persons used freedom of speech and other First Amendment rights to facilitate constitu-
tional equality movements); CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: 
A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (2017) (examining the use of First Amendment claims by—and 
against—LGBT persons). 
 126 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460–61 (1980) (observing that a discriminatory picketing 
law implicated both the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment). 
 127 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at Ch. 3 (discussing use of expressive rights claims during the early 
eras of the LGBT equality movement). 
 128 See Zick, supra note 10, at 18–21 (discussing expressive equality concept). 
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demonstrated and strengthened the synergies between these rights. 
Consider for example the constitutional movement for racial equality.  
Brown v. Board of Education did not actually secure constitutional equality—
even in the public schools.129  Significant progress toward racial equality 
required a lengthy campaign of legal and political agitation.  As Harry Kal-
ven, Jr. observed, during the 1950s and 1960s, the NAACP focused signifi-
cant energy and resources on First Amendment litigation.130  The NAACP 
invoked freedom of speech and other First Amendment rights to challenge 
state efforts to suppress criticism of government, limit private association, 
restrict public protest, and exclude African-Americans from public accom-
modations.131  Not all of these challenges were successful.  However, collec-
tively, they created critical breathing space for the civil rights movement.  
That space protected public protests and other forms of contention, which 
in turn facilitated the enactment of civil rights legislation.132 
Advocates of sexual orientation equality, to take another example, fol-
lowed a very similar path.133  Particularly during the earliest stages of agita-
tion, gay men and lesbians relied extensively on expressive rights in order to 
facilitate public acceptance and equal treatment under law.134  Although 
courts were not willing or prepared to recognize equality rights on behalf of 
gays and lesbians, they were willing to recognize and enforce their basic ex-
pressive rights.135  The First Amendment thus offered an early path to a 
form of constitutional equality that did not entail demonstrating suspect 
classification status under the Equal Protection Clause. 
First Amendment agitation did not always produce results for advocates 
of gay and lesbian equality.136  However, as was the case regarding racial 
 
 129 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 130 See generally KALVEN, supra note 19 (describing civil rights advocates’ reliance on First Amendment 
claims). 
 131 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (invalidating conviction of the leader of a group 
wishing to protest racial segregation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 
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of actions taken by Southern officials against civil rights activists); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (invalidating breach of peace convictions against civil rights protesters); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that an Alabama order 
requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First Amendment right 
of association).  See also KALVEN, supra note 19, Ch. 3 (discussing free speech challenges to segre-
gated lunch counters). 
 132 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 95 (2014) (noting 
that “television made all the difference, transforming the terrible scenes into an ugly symbol that 
shocked viewers throughout the nation”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 440–41 (2004) 
(noting the rise in public sympathy for civil rights causes after violent scenes were televised). 
 133 See Zick, supra note 10 (discussing LGBT equality movement); BALL, supra note 125 (same). 
 134 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, Ch. 3 (discussing early free speech, association, and free press cases). 
 135 See BALL, supra note 125. 
 136 See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 63 (1996) (“As an all-
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equality, free speech and other expressive claims helped secure critically 
important space for the gay equality movement.  Perhaps most importantly, 
recognition of basic expressive rights facilitated gay and lesbian political ag-
itation.  As Dale Carpenter has observed, in this and other respects, “[t]he 
First Amendment created gay America.”137 
As courts decided expressive claims brought by equality advocates, they 
simultaneously elaborated both free speech and equality rights.  Each free 
speech victory communicated basic respect for at least expressive equality, 
and perhaps for a more substantive equality down the line.  For equality 
advocates, successful First Amendment claims have generally been the first 
formal evidence that they enjoy any form of equality rights.  Indeed, for ex-
tended periods of time, recognition of expressive equality was the only real 
sense in which African-Americans, gays and lesbians, and other suppressed 
minorities were considered “equal” citizens.  Like Obergefell’s recognition of 
“equal dignity” rights, judicial recognition of “expressive equality” rights 
fashioned a distinctive liberty from the principles and values of two consti-
tutional guarantees.  Acting as background principles, expressive rights in-
fluenced the recognition and enforcement of equality rights.138  
We have been focusing on the courts.  However, this synergistic and ste-
reoscopic process occurred not only in courthouses, but in the streets, at 
lunch counters, in newspapers and other publications, in academic circles, 
and in homes and workplaces.  Press coverage of public protests and other 
expressive activities put racial equality on the national agenda.139  Iconic im-
ages of the events at Selma, Stonewall, and other places of conflict altered 
public opinion and eventually helped to produce legislative reforms.140  Le-
gal academics highlighted the connection between freedom of expression 
and constitutional equality, and published sophisticated First Amendment 
arguments against laws that denied equal expressive rights.141  Recognition 
and respect for expressive rights emboldened private and public coming out, 
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social and political organizing, and demands for equal treatment.142 
First Amendment rights, doctrines, and principles have also facilitated 
constitutional debate and discourse concerning constitutional equality.  
This discourse is a condition precedent to the elaboration and extension of 
constitutional equality rights.143  Civil rights legislation was the culmination 
of a decades-long national conversation about racial equality.144  Similarly, 
in Obergefell, the Supreme Court emphasized that the nation had been en-
gaged in a decades-long discourse about sexual orientation and equality.145  
According to the Court, this national debate had led to significant changes 
in our collective understanding of constitutional equality, which in turn 
supported recognition of a right to marital equality. 
As they relate to cumulative (as opposed to facilitative) claims, the dynam-
ics between First Amendment expressive rights and Fourteenth Amend-
ment equality rights have followed a distinct path.  Prior to the 1980s, the 
Supreme Court generally treated free speech and equality as fungible 
rights.  Civil rights and other speakers challenged laws and ordinances that 
restricted picketing, protests, and other expressive activities on both First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.146  As the Court ob-
served in one such case: 
Because Chicago treats some picketing differently from others, we analyze 
this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Of course, the equal protection claim in this case is closely 
intertwined with First Amendment interests; the Chicago ordinance affects 
picketing, which is expressive conduct; moreover, it does so by classifica-
tions formulated in terms of the subject of the picketing.147 
Note that the Court treats the “claim” as arising under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, but acknowledges that “First Amendment interests” are also 
implicated.  These things, the Court says, are “intertwined.”  What it does 
not explain, in any depth or detail, is that in such cases First Amendment 
and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees provide overlapping, but still dis-
tinctive, constitutional coverage.  The ordinance regulated “expressive 
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First Amendment ensures that all Americans can express their beliefs about the Constitution”). 
 144 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 132 (examining the complex political and judicial processes 
that led to civil rights advances during the twentieth century). 
 145 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (describing public and official discourse 
concerning same-sex marriage issue). 
 146 See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (challenge to an ordinance that 
prohibited most picketing outside schools, but exempted labor picketing). 
 147 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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conduct” (picketing), and thus implicated rights under the Free Speech 
Clause (and the Assembly Clause).  The ordinance also set up a classifica-
tion that distinguished between types of individual picketers, which is what 
triggered the Equal Protection Clause.  In such cases, expressive and equal-
ity rights act in concert and as related or cognate guarantees.  They protect 
against similar but distinctive types of governmental discrimination. 
Today, litigants continue to bring cumulative or alternative claims similar 
to the one described above.  However, over time, the Court has clarified the 
doctrinal boundaries between freedom of speech and equality in a manner 
that generally produces a fairly strict segregation of rights claims.  Modern-
day litigants have the best chance of success when they challenge content-
based restrictions affecting picketing and similar activities on First Amend-
ment grounds.  The doctrinal calculus here is straightforward.  Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, classifications not based on suspect or quasi-suspect 
differences are subject only to rational basis review, while under the First 
Amendment content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.148  
In essence, as a result of doctrinal development, separate doctrines now 
channel claims regulating expression based on content into a First Amend-
ment framework, while claims challenging other types of discriminatory state 
action are channeled into a Fourteenth Amendment framework. 
This channeling and segregation resembles the modern treatment of 
claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as described 
earlier.  In both contexts, courts have segregated rights rather than elabo-
rated the synergies between them.  In both contexts, doctrinal clarity has 
come at the potential cost of eliminating rights synergies or at least serious 
consideration of the connections between rights. 
To highlight just one example, owing to the constraints of the Equal 
Protection Clause, gay men and lesbians relied heavily—and largely unsuc-
cessfully—on the Free Speech Clause in challenges to the military’s Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell policy and in employment discrimination cases.149  Rather 
 
 148 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that the First Amendment stands for the 
proposition that the government may not prohibit expression even if it finds it offensive or disa-
greeable); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
 149 For federal courts of appeals cases rejecting the First Amendment argument, see Able v. United 
States, 155 F.3d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1998) (overturning the district court’s ruling that the first 
amendment was violated); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that the First Amendment is not implicated when the discharge was on the basis of 
conduct); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the First Amendment 
argument against the DOD directive); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting the argument that the First Amendment is violated); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 
931 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that because the statute only targets acts the First Amend-
ment is not implicated); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting a 
facial challenge under the First Amendment because the directive does not exclusively apply to 
speech); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amend-
ment argument because she was not discharged because of her speech); Woodward v. United 
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than viewing government actions in these cases as implicating both free 
speech and equality rights, courts focused myopically on freedom of speech.  
In doing so, they did not generally perceive any connection between ex-
pressive and equality rights—even in cases involving the explicit singling 
out of gay and lesbian communicative activities.150 
Despite judicial segregation, facilitative and cumulative claims have sig-
nificantly contributed to individual and relational understandings of expres-
sive and equality rights.  Facilitative claims supported a right to expressive 
equality that was critical to the advancement of constitutional equality and 
civil rights.  Cumulative claims highlighted the similarities and common 
purposes of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Prior to 
their doctrinal separation, these rights served as intersecting grounds for 
challenging discriminatory enactments that restricted or suppressed expres-
sive activity.  Doctrinal dynamics eventually pulled the rights apart, with 
important implications for both Fourteenth Amendment and First 
Amendment rights. 
3.  Dissent, Exclusion, and Conflict 
Rights Dynamism is not a static process.  Activists and litigants can re-
purpose constitutional rights to serve new and distinctive ends.  During the 
1950s and 1960s, race equality advocates obtained recognition for the im-
portant right to associate for the purpose of expressing support for equal pro-
tection and other rights.151  In ensuing decades, civic organizations invoked—
largely unsuccessfully—the First Amendment as a ground for excluding women 
and African-Americans from membership positions.152  Later, expressive or-
ganizations successfully invoked free speech and expressive association rights 
to exclude gay men and lesbians from membership—despite public accom-
modations laws that prohibited discrimination on these grounds.153 
 
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding the Navy’s discriminatory practice against 
homosexual conduct was rationally related to a permissible government purpose); Ben-Shalom v. 
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that there was “absolutely no First Amend-
ment violation”). 
 150 See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 141, at 319, 335. 
 151 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (holding that an Alabama 
order requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First Amendment 
right of association). 
 152 See New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1988) (upholding as 
constitutional a New York law which forbids membership organizations from excluding women 
and minorities); Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 
(1987) (holding that women could not be excluded on expressive grounds because of the State’s 
compelling interest to eliminate discrimination); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 
(1984) (holding that women could not be excluded from organization on expressive grounds). 
 153 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (application of anti-discrimination law to 
require Scouts to admit leader who was openly gay violated Scouts’ right of expressive associa-
tion); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) 
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These conflicts and precedents have contributed something important to 
our understanding of the expressive-equality relationship.  As I have dis-
cussed, equality movements have greatly benefitted from First Amendment 
dissenters’ rights.  Civil rights and equality advocates have relied heavily on 
free speech, association, and free press rights to challenge an array of official 
repression and discrimination.  However, the exclusionary cases demon-
strate that the relationship between First Amendment expressive rights and 
Fourteenth Amendment equality rights is not always, or necessarily, syner-
gistic and collaborative.  Expressive rights, including the right to speak and 
the right to associate, are quintessentially dissenters’ rights.  As such, they 
can be invoked not only by equality advocates, but also by those who resist 
the expansion of equality rights or state orthodoxy regarding those rights. 
These particular invocations and the resulting precedents created a new 
dynamic between freedom of speech (and expressive association) and equal 
protection—including a new interpretive dynamic.  Because they placed 
expressive and equality rights squarely in tension with one another, exclu-
sionary invocations of the First Amendment pressed courts to balance ex-
pressive rights against rights to equal treatment.  In some instances, particu-
larly with respect to exclusion of gay men and lesbians, that balancing 
produced an interpretation of the First Amendment as a formal limit on, 
rather than a facilitator of, equal protection rights.154 
The exclusionary cases highlight some of the basic mechanics and in-
terpretive effects of Rights Dynamism.  Litigants and activists invoked an 
expressive right in a new manner and for a new purpose—one that was 
consistent with traditional values of dissent and associative freedom, to be 
sure, but that also complicated understandings of the relationship between 
expressive and equality rights.155  Instead of working toward the shared goal 
of equality, in this context the relationship between expressive and equality 
rights became far more tense and strained. 
As noted, Rights Dynamism is not merely an internal, court-centric 
process.  As Professor Carlos Ball has recently shown, gay rights and First 
Amendment rights have a long and contentious social and political histo-
ry.156  Many cultural and political forces influenced the turn from First 
Amendment shield to First Amendment sword.  Broad public debates 
 
(application of anti-discrimination law to require parade organizers to allow gay group to march 
in parade violates organizers’ right not to be compelled to speak); BALL, supra note 125 (focusing 
on the use of First Amendment expressive and religious liberty rights to oppose LGBT inclusion 
and equality). 
 154 See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (holding that Boy Scouts of America had a First Amendment right 
to exclude gay men and lesbians from membership). 
 155 See generally BALL, supra note 125, Chs. 6, 7 (examining the use of First Amendment rights as exclu-
sionary weapons during the LGBT equality movement). 
 156 See id. Ch. 6 (discussing the cultural and political background for exclusionary invocations of the 
Free Speech Clause). 
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about free speech protection played a role.  Among other things, the exclu-
sionary cases were decided at roughly the same time that courts, scholars, 
and the public were considering the regulation of hateful and derogatory 
speech directed in particular at African-Americans.157 
The upshot of that conversation, in judicial fora and more generally, 
was a strong re-affirmation of First Amendment anti-orthodoxy principles 
that prohibit government from suppressing speech on the ground that it is 
hateful, derogatory, or exclusionary.158  First Amendment rights are not al-
ways a trump; however, in American culture and jurisprudence they exert 
powerful moral and constitutional influence.159 
Cross-doctrinal influences also played a role in ushering in and sustain-
ing this new phase of the expression-equality relationship.  Particularly in 
cases involving exclusion of gay men and lesbians, the success of the expres-
sive claims related, in part, to the perceived weakness of the equality inter-
est being asserted.  Under equal protection doctrine, government actions 
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are reviewed under a 
forgiving rational basis standard.160  Under that standard, governments are 
not precluded from taking sexual orientation into account.  Thus, in con-
trast to race and gender equality rights, LGBT equality rights were not ro-
bust enough to overcome some expressive association claims. 
Rights Dynamism is an ongoing and perpetual process.  The Court’s 
First Amendment decisions preserved limited organizational rights to ex-
clude persons on expressive grounds, but also allowed the broader social 
and political debate concerning LGBT rights to continue.  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s exclusionary decisions were not the final word.  Indeed, 
as public and official perceptions of LGBT persons and their rights evolved, 
some organizations—most  notably the Boy Scouts of America—eventually 
reversed their policies excluding gays and lesbians.161 
Further, Obergefell signals that classifications based on sexual orientation 
 
 157 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (invalidating local “hate speech” ordi-
nance).  For critical analysis of the expressive and equality values implicated by hate speech regu-
lation, see, for example, JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); RICHARD 
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND 
THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial 
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (1982). 
 158 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394 (holding that governments cannot single out for regulation “messages 
of racial, gender, or religious intolerance”). 
 159 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. 
STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (2002) (noting the populari-
ty and influence of the First Amendment—particularly the free speech guarantee—in American 
social, political, and legal cultures). 
 160 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny to a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment that discriminated against gay men and lesbians). 
 161 See Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts End Ban on Gay Leaders, Over Protests by Mormon Church, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
27, 2015, at A1. 
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might receive more rigorous scrutiny in some cases.162  Litigants and activ-
ists will continue to examine and test the boundaries of the First Amend-
ment right to exclude.163  Courts will elaborate this right, and the relation-
ship between expressive and equality rights, in future cases.  And all of this 
will occur against a backdrop of changing cultural, political, and legal influ-
ences regarding the rights of gay men, lesbians, and other minorities. 
Civil rights and equality activists fought for and obtained expressive 
rights that protected and facilitated political mobilization on behalf of equal 
protection.  These rights later enabled organizations opposed to inclusion 
to preserve what they considered an important form of organizational and 
expressive autonomy.  In turn, these new invocations of expressive rights 
gave rise to dynamic elaboration in the courts—both of expressive rights 
and of the relationship between expressive and equality rights.  A new 
phase of tension and conflict changed the tenor and substance of this rela-
tionship.  This is generally what Rights Dynamism and dynamic elabora-
tion look like as they occur on the ground. 
4.  Bi-Directional Elaboration 
Rights Dynamism leads to dynamic elaboration of constitutional rights.  
Over time, as rights intersect and find themselves in conversation with vary-
ing degrees of frequency, the meanings of individual textual provisions are 
elaborated.  This elaboration is bi-directional, in the sense that the mean-
ings of both rights in the relationship are affected by their interactions.  
Dynamic forces also affect interpretations and understandings of the rela-
tionships between rights. 
We have already seen how understandings of the Due Process Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause have been affected by their intermittent inter-
sections.164  In the case of freedom of speech and equal protection rights, the 
bi-directional effects are even clearer and stronger.  Indeed, owing to the 
frequency and significance of their interactions, we cannot fully understand 
modern conceptions of either Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment 
rights without reference to the dynamic intersection between them. 
Early movement cases involving African-Americans, gay men, and les-
bians established what I have called a right of “expressive equality.”165  The 
combination of freedom of speech and equal protection requires, at a min-
 
 162 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (stating that gay men and lesbians are entitled 
to “the full promise of liberty”). 
 163 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (rejecting the claim 
that application of an anti-discrimination law to compel a photographer to render services to a 
gay couple violated First Amendment). 
 164 See supra Part II.A. 
 165 See Zick, supra note 10, at 18–21. 
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imum, that individuals be granted basic rights to speak, associate, and pub-
lish information.  This is a more limited form of equality than civil rights 
advocates wished to obtain.  Nevertheless, it was an important antecedent 
to a more robust conception of equal treatment under law.  Expressive 
equality protected the rights of despised minorities to do what others were 
freely able to do under the law’s protection—to express identity, to openly 
criticize government, to assemble together, and to disseminate information. 
Expressive equality has been an important precursor to substantive 
equality.  Indeed, without expressive rights, some equality claims would 
have been significantly delayed or perhaps even denied altogether.  Absent 
public agitation, judicial and legislative elaboration of racial equality rights 
would have been suppressed or stymied.  Some equality rights have sprung 
from or originated in free speech principles and concepts.  Thus, in the 
opening lines of the decision in Obergefell, the Supreme Court observed that 
the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause protect “a liberty that 
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to 
define and express their identity.”166  The passage recognizes a special link be-
tween expressive equality and substantive equality.  The right to freely de-
fine and express one’s sexual identity is a right grounded in equal protec-
tion principles. 
More generally, early claims by civil rights advocates established that 
equal protection provided an effective and independent ground for chal-
lenging certain forms of expressive discrimination.  Through this aspect of 
the dynamic intersection of equality and free speech or expression we 
learned that a central function of equality rights is to police and remedy 
discriminatory classifications of all types.  As noted earlier, equal protection 
doctrine now does this largely through skeptical review of suspect and qua-
si-suspect classifications, with rationality review applied to socio-economic 
classifications.  As the intersection with expressive claims demonstrated, 
however, equality rights and expressive rights serve the same basic function 
of imposing formal neutrality requirements on government. 
At the same time, contemporary understandings of the First Amend-
ment’s expressive guarantees—particularly freedom of speech and expres-
sive association—can be traced to equality advocates’ invocation of expres-
sive rights and to equality principles more generally.  The frequent 
interactions of the free speech and equality guarantees have profoundly 
shaped contemporary understandings of the First Amendment. 
As Harry Kalven, Jr. observed, the race equality movement worked 
profound changes in the law of free speech, press, privacy, and association.  
As Kalven presciently stated: “[W]e may come to see the Negro as winning 
 
 166 Obergefell, 129 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added). 
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back for us the freedom the Communists seem to have lost for us.”167  Kal-
ven was referring to a series of early free speech cases in which the convic-
tions of radicals, anarchists, and communists who had advocated overthrow 
of government had been upheld by the Supreme Court.168  During the 
Warren Court era, by contrast, the Supreme Court frequently ruled in fa-
vor of civil rights activists who were engaged in peaceful public protests and 
other forms of equality agitation.169 
Over time, civil rights precedents would become part of the First 
Amendment’s bedrock.  Free speech precedents expanded access to public 
fora, protected robust criticism of government officials, imposed rigorous 
content-neutrality and anti-orthodoxy principles, and established strong as-
sociative rights.170  The rights recognized in these cases have been invoked 
not only by subsequent equality movements, but also by a long and ever-
expanding list of political, social, and cultural dissenters. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the judicial, political, and cultural atten-
tion to equality rights ultimately influenced the Supreme Court to interpret 
the Free Speech Clause as including a “neutrality” principle.171  As we have 
seen, during the civil rights era content neutrality rules became a central 
component of the modern conception of freedom of speech.  The free 
speech neutrality principle revolutionized free speech doctrine by importing 
equality values into the Free Speech Clause.172 
As a result of their dynamic intersection with equality rights, we have al-
so learned something about the limits of the Free Speech Clause.  For ex-
ample, civil rights advocates successfully invoked the Due Process Clause, 
not the Free Speech Clause, to negate the use of trespass laws to remove 
African-Americans from lunch counters and other public places.173  Dec-
ades later, courts similarly rejected First Amendment challenges by gay 
men and lesbians to discriminatory employment dismissals and enforce-
 
 167 KALVEN, supra note 19, at 7. 
 168 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951). 
 169 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1965) (invalidating the conviction of a leader of 
a civil rights group seeking to protest racial segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 
229, 235 (1963). 
 170 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (invalidating a conviction for disturbing the 
peace based on the free speech right to be present in a public library reading room); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (observing that debate regarding matters of pub-
lic concern, including commentary on the behavior of public officials, should be “uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recogniz-
ing the right of anonymous association). 
 171 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 
(1975) (observing that there is a “principle of equal liberty of expression . . . inherent in the first 
amendment”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 
233, 274–80 (noting a similar connection). 
 172 I should note that not all commentators have greeted this as a salutary event.  See, e.g., Robert C. 
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997). 
 173 See KALVEN, supra note 19, Ch. 3 (discussing free speech claims in sit-in cases). 
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ment of the U.S. military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell regulations.174  During 
the early phases of the LGBT equality movement, First Amendment doc-
trines relating to sexually explicit speech sometimes failed to protect forms 
of sexual dissent.175  These cases and conflicts suggested that despite its 
strong legal and moral force, the Free Speech Clause, as interpreted, did 
not protect all forms of equality speech. 
Further, as discussed earlier, the LGBT experience indicated that First 
Amendment rights can be invoked for defensive and exclusionary purposes.  
The Supreme Court recognized a right not to associate, at least for certain 
expressive organizations.  As articulated by the Court, this right not to asso-
ciate is potentially broad enough to threaten many anti-discrimination 
laws.176  The exclusionary right of expressive association, which was recog-
nized in cases involving exclusion of gay men and lesbians, could have far-
reaching effects across a range of disadvantaged classes.  At the same time, 
the right to exclude based on expressive grounds is critically important to 
individual and organizational autonomy.177 
Rights Dynamism has also revealed something about the relative 
weights or values of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held that officials could not 
single out derogatory words or actions for punishment—even if they were 
part of a category of expression that was not covered by the First Amend-
ment.178  R.A.V. reaffirms the First Amendment’s strong content-neutrality 
requirement.  However, the Court’s ruling was also a direct response to the 
city’s claim that protection of racial dignity and equality deserve special 
protection.  R.A.V.’s holding elaborates a principle under which expressive 
rights cannot be sacrificed to equality or dignity interests.  The decision 
could have broad consequences with regard to future efforts to regulate 
threats, fighting words, libel, and other harmful speech.179 
In sum, Rights Dynamism is a process in which constitutional rights are 
 
 174 See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (overturning a 
damages award for a bisexual employee terminated for disclosing the nature of her sexuality); 
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 853–57 (D. Md. 1973), aff’d, 359 F.3d 498 (4th 
Cir. 1974) (upholding dismissal of a public school teacher who disclosed that he was gay and 
commented in the media on his subsequent dismissal); supra note 112. 
 175 See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772 (1977) (applying liberal interpretation of obscenity law to 
regulation of “lesbianism, and sadism and masochism”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 203 (arguing 
that “Miller’s [obscenity] framework has encouraged censorship of harmless gay pornography 
while allowing violently misogynistic straight pornography.”). 
 176 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting 
an argument by a wedding photographer who refused service to a gay couple that application of 
state anti-discrimination laws violated her First Amendment speech and association rights). 
 177 See generally INAZU, supra note 22. 
 178 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992). 
 179 See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and 
Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 553 (1996). 
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elaborated over time, partly as a consequence of their frequent intersection.  
This elaboration is bi-directional.  Thus, we must ask not only what expressive 
rights have done for equality rights, but also what equality agitation has done to 
expressive rights.  More generally, we cannot fully understand the modern 
scope, recognition, and protection of either equal protection or freedom of 
expression without accounting for their frequent intersections across time. 
C.  Freedom of Expression and Free Exercise of Religion 
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
have frequently intersected.  These rights have greatly facilitated, rein-
forced, and illuminated one another.180  However, over a long period of 
time, Rights Dynamism has produced significant changes in their relation-
ship.  Most notably, in some respects the Free Speech Clause has come to 
dominate and subordinate the Free Exercise Clause.  This has led some 
commentators to wonder whether the Free Exercise Clause might now be 
“redundant.”181  As with the other relationships, this one is multi-
dimensional.  The intersection between freedom of speech and free exercise 
of religion has affected interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and, to a 
lesser extent, the Establishment Clause.  It has also influenced the articula-
tion of a number of expressive concepts, doctrines, and principles. 
1.  Early Synergy and Mutual Illumination 
The origins of the free speech-free exercise intersection can be traced to 
pre-ratification practices and concepts.182  Religious adherents have always 
relied heavily on free speech and free press activities to proselytize and 
practice religion.183  Ultimately, the Constitution’s Framers provided over-
lapping, yet distinctive, protections for both expressive and religious rights.  
Although expressive guarantees are broader in scope, freedoms of belief, 
conscience, and expression are covered by both provisions. 
As in other cases, the Framers did not make explicit—either in their de-
liberations or the text itself—what the relationship between these rights was 
or ought to be.  Like others discussed in this Article, the relationship be-
tween free speech and free exercise rights has largely been worked out over 
time, through the process of Rights Dynamism.  In the modern era, the 
process began during the 1930s and 1940s, when Jehovah’s Witnesses 
 
 180 See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 791 
(2014) (“The First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly once rein-
forced each other.”). 
 181 See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 73 (2001) (“Contemporary constitutional doctrine may render the 
Free Exercise Clause redundant.”). 
 182 See McConnell, supra note 59. 
 183 Yoder, supra note 59. 
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brought a raft of constitutional challenges to restrictions on proselytizing, 
soliciting, and other public activities.184  America was becoming more plu-
ralistic in terms of faiths and religious practices.  The Witnesses were fre-
quently targeted and discriminated against by forces that saw religious plu-
ralism as a threat to American culture. 
The Witnesses did something fateful in terms of litigation strategy.  
They brought cumulative claims, in which they typically invoked free ex-
pression (speech, press, and assembly) and free exercise rights.185  These 
claims provided the Supreme Court with an early opportunity to consider 
both the independent substance and relational qualities of these rights. 
The Hughes Court responded, in part, by labeling both expressive and 
free exercise rights “fundamental” and “preferred.”186  Thus, from an early 
point in their jurisprudential relationship, the Court treated freedom of 
speech and free exercise of religion as critical individual rights and compo-
nents of a powerful framework for individual liberty. 
Not much is known about the internal dynamics of the Hughes Court, 
including its consideration of early free expression and free exercise cas-
es.187  As Rights Dynamism suggests, the Court’s understanding of the rela-
tionship between these rights appears to have evolved over time. 
In the first few cases, the Supreme Court did not even address inde-
pendent free exercise claims that had been raised along with free speech 
and free press claims.188  However, as the Witnesses continued to pursue 
their agenda in the courts, the Court gradually began to separately address 
some of the free exercise claims.189  This led to early interpretations of both 
Clauses and of the relationship between them. 
What emerged was a synergistic and bi-directional rights relationship, 
similar in many respects to others we have considered.  Although it frequent-
ly grounded its decisions in free speech and other expressive principles, the 
Hughes Court also articulated the core substance of what would later become 
modern free exercise rights.  And, of course, the Court handed down some of 
the earliest interpretations of free speech and other expressive rights. 
Applying free speech principles, the Hughes Court concluded that religious 
 
 184 For a description of the cases, see Feldman, supra note 65, at 443–51; Hildebrand, supra note 33, 
at 150–59. 
 185 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 186 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom of speech, 
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Hughes Court Docket Books: The Early Terms, 1929–1933, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 103 (2015). 
 188 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
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adherents had a right to access the streets, a public resource, on equal terms 
and for the express purpose of exercising religion.190  The Court also shielded 
religious proselytizing and recruiting from a variety of repressive state and local 
laws.191  It barred government from discriminating against or targeting religion 
or religious practices, invalidated prior restraints on religious exercise, and in-
validated tax schemes that effectively suppressed religious practices.192 
Even when the grounds for decision were based on expressive doctrines 
or concepts, the Hughes Court simultaneously elaborated the broad con-
tours of religious liberty under the Free Exercise and, to a lesser extent, the 
Establishment Clause.  Thus, when it granted religious adherents access to 
public streets based upon freedom of speech and assembly principles, the 
Court established that religious observers were entitled to enjoy at least some 
public resources on an equal basis.193  Applying free speech principles, the 
Court observed that religious adherents were not generally entitled to ex-
emptions from neutral and generally applicable laws such as content-neutral 
permit requirements.194  At the same time, the Court held that government 
was prohibited from discriminating against religion or singling it out for spe-
cial burdens.195  The Court held that governments were prohibited from 
imposing unconstitutional conditions—i.e., forcing one to choose between 
practicing a chosen religion and receiving government resources—on reli-
gious adherents.196  Finally, it ruled that government officials were not em-
powered to determine whether a religious belief was sincere, or whether an 
activity in some sense “counted” as religious in its nature or purpose.197 
Many decades later, after much doctrinal churn, these early interpreta-
tions would become central premises of the modern Free Exercise Clause.  To 
be sure, the Hughes Court did not fully elaborate all Religion Clauses doc-
trines.  However, as it processed cumulative expressive and religious claims, 
the Court began to articulate the basic outlines of the scope of religious free-
dom in the nascent regulatory state.  Although expressive rights were the pri-
mary vehicle for this early elaboration, the recognition and enforcement of 
expressive rights—rights to access public resources, protections against dis-
crimination, etc.—benefitted and illuminated religious rights as well. 
As the discussion suggests, the relationship between these rights has al-
ways been bi-directional.  I have explained how free expression principles 
 
 190 See, e.g., Schneider, 301 U.S. at 160 (holding that municipality had to allow religious speakers to 
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 191 See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451 (invalidating restrictions on distribution of literature in public places). 
 192 See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307–08 (invalidating solicitation ban on free exercise grounds); Fol-
lett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944) (invalidating tax on religious activities). 
 193 Schneider, 301 U.S. at 160. 
 194 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
 195 Id. at 307. 
 196 Id. 
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and doctrines led to early interpretations of religious freedoms.  The early 
dynamic between freedom of expression and free exercise of religion had 
an even more pronounced effect on expressive doctrines and principles.198  
Most of the fundamental concepts and principles of modern free speech 
doctrine were first articulated during the 1930s and 1940s, in the Witnesses 
cases.  Indeed, it may only be a slight exaggeration to say that one could 
teach nearly all of the fundamental principles of modern freedom of expres-
sion doctrine through the early Hughes Court decisions. 
For example, efforts to suppress religious expression and practices 
helped the Court identify and elaborate central Free Speech Clause con-
cepts.  Prior to the Witnesses cases, courts had generally adopted the view 
that public streets and parks were under the exclusive and plenary control 
of the governments that held title to them.199  However, starting in the 
1930s, the Court began to recognize that “public forum” properties such as 
public streets had “immemorially” been open to the public for the purpose 
of expressive activities and were held in trust by government for the benefit 
of all speakers.200  Through their challenges to restrictions on the ability to 
distribute literature and otherwise engage with citizens in the public streets, 
the Witnesses forged the first real breathing space for public debate and in-
formation flow in public places.201  Decades later, the civil rights movement 
and many other causes would rely heavily on the principles and precedents 
of this early dynamic. 
In its rulings striking down solicitation bans, discriminatory license tax-
es, prior restraints, and permit schemes, the Hughes Court emphasized that 
all speakers, including religious ones, had a right to access public streets and 
parks.202  The Court allowed state and local governments to regulate the 
time, place, and manner of expression and to attend to other public order 
concerns.203  However, it struck down facially discriminatory laws, permit 
schemes that were based upon the unbridled discretion of public officials, 
and discriminatory taxes and penalties.204  The Court also indicated that 
some speech is not covered, as a categorical matter, by the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause—thus anticipating the modern categorical ap-
proach to free speech coverage.205  Finally, the Court held that officials 
 
 198 See Hildebrand, supra note 33, at 133 (observing “that a coherent First Amendment tradition hon-
oring the centrality of rich public debate began as early as the 1930s . . . .”). 
 199 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 200 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
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 202 See Hildebrand, supra note 33, at 156–58. 
 203 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
 204 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940). 
 205 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (discussing the “fighting words” cat-
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could not suppress speech merely because it offended a public audience.206 
And there was much more to these precedents in terms of elaboration 
of expressive rights.  With regard to freedom of speech and press, the early 
Hughes Court decisions also: (1) held that speech restrictions based on the 
content of speech or the identity of the speaker were presumptively uncon-
stitutional;207 (2) recognized a First Amendment right of willing audiences 
to receive information;208 (3) held that audiences who were captive in their 
homes had the right to decide whether to receive unwanted expression;209 
(4) recognized that even false statements of fact could be valuable to public 
debate;210 (5) rejected governmental efforts to characterize speech as 
“commercial,” and thus outside the First Amendment’s coverage, on the 
ground that the publisher might receive some remuneration for her materi-
als;211  and (6) held that the Free Speech Clause protects a right not to speak 
or be compelled to communicate.212  All of these concepts and principles 
are now central aspects of contemporary First Amendment doctrine. 
As importantly, the discriminatory treatment and explicit exclusion of re-
ligious speakers encouraged the Court to think about the reasons or justifica-
tions for protecting expressive rights.  Long before the Warren Court made 
its storied turn toward liberal protection for free speech rights, the Hughes 
Court drew connections between public religious speech and concepts such 
as the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-government.213  The Court 
also recognized the autonomy interests of religious speakers, and the im-
portance to individual self-fulfillment of communicating religious ideas.214 
The product of this deliberation appeared explicitly in the Court’s deci-
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sion in Cantwell v. Connecticut,215 which invalidated—on both free speech and 
free exercise grounds—a permit scheme targeting religious solicitation. The 
Court stated: 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differ-
ences arise.  In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest er-
ror to his neighbor.  To persuade others to his own point of view, the 
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men 
who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false 
statement.  But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of histo-
ry, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties 
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on 
the part of the citizens of a democracy.216 
In general, the Hughes Court decisions reflect an appreciation both for 
the independent significance of distinctive expressive and religious rights as 
well as for their potential to mutually reinforce and illuminate one another.  
The Court often relied exclusively on expressive claims.217  This explains 
why the cases from this early era are typically regarded as important prece-
dents concerning First Amendment free speech, free press, and assembly 
rights.  However, as I have shown, the decisions were also critical to the 
recognition and interpretation of free exercise rights.  In addition to recog-
nizing First Amendment rights as fundamental and “preferred,” the Court 
interpreted them in a manner that highlighted their synergistic and collabo-
rative relationship.  Similar to the expression-equality dynamic, recognition 
and enforcement of expressive rights created public breathing space for the 
free exercise of religion.  In turn, recognition of free exercise rights helped 
to create a stronger foundation for expressive rights. 
The early Witnesses cases highlighted the commonalities and synergies 
between fundamental and “preferred” free speech and free exercise rights.  
Separately and together, these individual rights forged a strong framework 
for constitutional liberty.  As the Court considered claims based on both 
expressive and free exercise rights, it began to elaborate doctrines and prin-
ciples in both areas.  This process of elaboration would continue in subse-
quent decades.  However, as governments and religious adherents absorbed 
the lessons of the initial intersection, and as social, political, and legal cir-
cumstances changed, the relationship between freedom of expression and 
free exercise rights would undergo some important changes. 
  
 
 215 Id. at 300–01 (1940) (invalidating statute on free speech an exercise grounds). 
 216 Id. at 310. 
 217 See Feldman, supra note 65, at 448 (observing that the Hughes Court typically relied on expressive 
grounds). 
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2.  A Preference for Expressive Rights and Rationales 
Although it elaborated both free expression and free exercise principles 
in early cases, the Hughes Court generally preferred to ground decisions in 
free speech and press principles rather than free exercise rationales.  As 
noted earlier, the Hughes Court rarely analyzed free exercise claims inde-
pendently.  The most common disposition was to hold that the statute or 
ordinance being challenged violated freedom of speech, press, and religion, 
with little or no separate consideration given to the free exercise claim.218  
Even Cantwell, which involved the Hughes Court’s most specific analysis of 
a freestanding free exercise claim, appeared to rest primarily on free speech 
and free press principles relating to prior restraints and state censorship.219  
Thus, although the Court was fleshing out both expressive and free exercise 
rights and highlighting synergies between them, in terms of its explications 
freedom of expression was already doing the lion’s share of the work. 
Commentators have suggested that the Hughes Court favored or “pre-
ferred” free speech rights over free exercise rights, and that this preference 
was rooted in external social and political changes.220  For instance, Stephen 
Feldman has argued that the transformation of American democracy in the 
1920s and 1930s, from a republican to a more pluralistic system, helps to ex-
plain why the Court typically granted relief based on free speech rather than 
free exercise rationales.221  According to Feldman, the Justices may have per-
ceived the Witnesses’ religious liberty claims as being in tension with Ameri-
can democratic ideals.222  He suggested that the mostly Protestant jurists may 
have viewed the Witnesses as “outsiders” pursuing special religious rights, ra-
ther than broad-based democratic values like those at the core of freedom of 
speech and press.223  As Feldman summarized his argument: 
One reason, then, that the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court favored 
free expression over religious freedom during the 1930s and 1940s was that 
the religious freedom claims were more likely than the free expression 
claims to intensify the salience of the Justices’ separation from the claim-
ants as outsiders.224 
As noted, we still know very little about the Hughes Court’s internal de-
 
 218 Id. at 448 (“Without the support of free expression, a religious freedom claim inevitably failed.”). 
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liberations.225  In terms of Rights Dynamism, it is certainly possible that so-
cial and political conceptions of pluralism and democracy partially shaped 
the Court’s approach to the cumulative rights claims before them.  Howev-
er, as discussed earlier, the Hughes Court adopted a constitutional frame-
work that actually extended significant protections to both freedom of ex-
pression and free exercise of religion.  Even when it did not rest decisions 
explicitly on free exercise grounds, the Court reasoned in a way that sug-
gested a synergy and collaboration between expressive and religious liber-
ties.  At the least, in most cases, ruling in favor of expressive rights signifi-
cantly facilitated the Witnesses’ free exercise rights as well.  Although 
Feldman’s thesis might help to explain a “preference” for expressive 
frameworks and principles, the Hughes Court was hardly anti-free exercise. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the Hughes Court generally preferred to explain 
its rulings in expressive terms.  Rights Dynamism suggests some additional or 
perhaps alternative explanations for this early and ultimately fateful preference. 
 For one thing, the activities in question—speaking, distributing litera-
ture, soliciting, and gathering in public—very closely resembled speech, 
press, and assembly activities.  In this sense, as a matter of both conceptual 
familiarity and historical experience, the Witnesses’ grievances were the 
natural province of the First Amendment’s free speech, press, and assembly 
guarantees.  By the 1930s, public streets had already been the focus of free 
speech battles involving labor agitators, political dissenters, and others.226  
The Witnesses’ claims were a natural extension of the fundamental issue 
raised by these early conflicts—namely, whether government had the au-
thority to declare public streets and other venues speech-free zones.  In 
terms of its own agenda, the Hughes Court’s primary goal may have been 
to address the matter of speakers’ access to the public forum generally ra-
ther than to articulate religious rights. 
Further, at this very early stage, cross-doctrinal issues may have affected 
the preference for expressive frameworks and rationales.  When the Hughes 
Court first encountered the Witnesses’ claims, the Free Exercise Clause had 
been interpreted quite narrowly—principally  as a protection for religious 
beliefs rather than religious activities.227  The extent to which the free exer-
cise guarantee extended beyond conscience and belief was at that point un-
clear.  By contrast, even at this early stage, it was clear that the Free Speech 
Clause extended to at least some expressive conduct.228  Moreover, the 
Court had issued several decisions under the Free Speech Clause protecting 
 
 225 See Cushman, supra note 187. 
 226 See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1999). 
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offensive solicitation and proselytizing.229  Expressive rights claims were 
thus both more familiar and better established than their Free Exercise 
Clause counterparts. 
In sum, as Rights Dynamism posits, a multitude of factors—the litiga-
tion strategies of claimants, the nature and substance of their claims, the 
identity of the claimants, judicial attitudes and agendas, societal and politi-
cal influences, and doctrinal developments—all likely influenced the 
Court’s earliest approach to the relationship between expressive and free 
exercise rights.  For a variety of reasons, in the beginning the Court was 
more comfortable communicating its rulings in expressive terms.  Later, 
that comfort would morph into something else—the substitution of free 
speech rights for religious free exercise rights. 
3.  Subordinating the Free Exercise Clause 
As we have seen, rights relationships change over the course of time.  
Rights dynamics are affected by many influences and forces, both within 
and outside the judicial branch.  By the early 1980s, the relationship be-
tween freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion was undergoing a 
significant transformation.  During the next phase of the relationship, the 
Free Speech Clause would become the dominant partner in the relation-
ship.  In fact, the subordination of free exercise rights to free speech rights 
would lead some commentators to wonder whether the Free Exercise 
Clause had essentially become “redundant.”230 
Beginning in the 1980s, religious adherents began once again to turn to 
the Free Speech Clause—this time, mainly in challenges to what they al-
leged were discriminatory exclusions from public facilities and subsidies.  
Concerns about separation of church and state had led some localities to 
adopt policies that singled out religious adherents for exclusion.  In re-
sponse, like civil rights advocates during the 1950s and 1960s, during the 
1980s and 1990s religious liberty activists turned to the courts for relief. 
In deciding the equal access cases, the Rehnquist Court relied exclusively 
on the Free Speech Clause—even when the Free Exercise Clause was also 
invoked, and even where free exercise was an equally plausible ground for 
decision.231  To be sure, during the equal access era, some litigants still pur-
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sued cumulative free speech and free exercise claims.  But for a number of 
reasons, religious adherents came increasingly to rely on free speech claims 
to the eventual exclusion of free exercise claims.  By the 1990s, the Hughes 
Court preference for rationalizing decisions involving both free exercise 
and free speech claims in expressive terms had been replaced by full reli-
ance on the Free Speech Clause—even where the central claim involved 
explicit discrimination against religious adherents. 
The dynamics that brought about this transformation were complex 
and multi-faceted.  One important shift occurred at the level of constitu-
tional advocacy.  Beginning in the 1980s, religious liberty activists began to 
pursue a strategic litigation agenda that facilitated religious rights through 
free speech claims.232  As one student of this strategy explained: “After sev-
eral years of frustrating losses in the courts arguing the religion clauses, 
New Christian Right lawyers turned to the free speech clause with a venge-
ance in the late 1980s.”233  
The free speech strategy, which was borrowed from civil rights, labor, 
and other movements, was both a reaction to what religious liberty advo-
cates perceivd as the public marginalzation of religion and a means of pro-
tecting religious proselytization from governmental suppression.234  The 
free speech strategy was no secret.  Indeed, leaders of the religious liberty 
movement publicly touted it.  As one of the principal architects of the strat-
egy commented: “[T]he free speech strategy has proven effective with 
judges across the ideological spectrum against opponents who rely on the 
First Amendment’s clause against the establishment of religion.”235 
As this statement suggests, the legal strategy was driven in part by doc-
trinal concerns relating to the religion clauses—in particular, the Estab-
lishment Clause, which prohibited government from aiding religion in cer-
tain ways.236  Free speech claims appeared to avoid or sidestep possible 
Establishment Clause complications associated with providing public bene-
fits to religious adherents.  Under the free speech rationale, religious adher-
ents were merely demanding equal treatment as speakers—not special bene-
fits as religious persons or institutions.  This approach was more attractive 
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to judges across the ideological spectrum.   
Developments in free speech doctrine also help to explain the dynamic 
that led to a strong turn in the direction of the Free Speech Clause.  In the 
decades between the Hughes Court’s decisions and the Rehnquist Court’s 
re-consideration of the free speech-free exercise relationship, free speech 
doctrine had become far more stable and robust relative to free exercise 
doctrine.  Thus, by the 1980s, the Court had developed the core of its pub-
lic forum doctrine, which extended free speech protections to public prop-
erties other than public streets and parks.237  Further, aided in part by an 
abundance of academic commentary on free speech doctrine and theory, 
the Court had elaborated strong content-neutrality rules.238  
Under free speech doctrine as it stood in the 1980s, laws and regula-
tions that discriminated based on the content of speech were subject to 
strict scrutiny and were presumptively invalid.239  Moreover, as interpreted, 
the Free Speech Clause was capacious enough to encompass not only reli-
gious discussions but perhaps too a great many religious practices.  These 
broad free speech protections had assisted speakers seeking access to a wide 
variety of public properties and programs.  In sum, between the Hughes 
Court’s minimal access decisions and the Rehnquist Court’s equal access 
decisions, the Free Speech Clause had become an increasingly robust and 
reliable guarantee of equal access and equal treatment for all speakers. 
In contrast, by the 1980s, the Court’s free exercise framework, which 
purported to apply heightened scrutiny even to laws that incidentally bur-
dened religious beliefs or practices, was considered by some to be unworka-
ble and unstable.240  Moreover, the Court’s decisions striking down school 
prayer and certain public religious displays suggested that at least some reli-
gious speech was not covered by the Free Exercise Clause and/or might be 
barred by the Establishment Clause.241 
The Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held 
that religious adherents were not entitled to constitutional exemptions from 
neutral and generally applicable laws, suggested a considerable weakening 
of the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantor of equal access and equal treat-
ment.242  Although the Court clarified after Smith that explicit forms of dis-
crimination against religion could still be challenged under the Free Exer-
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cise Clause, the scope of constitutional free exercise rights appeared to be 
narrower and somewhat uncertain relative to free speech protections.243 
Note that Smith was an important event in the free speech turn, but does 
not fully explain it.  Reliance on the Free Speech Clause started very early 
in the Rehnquist Court era—in some instances, well before Smith was de-
cided.  In some cases, religious adherents abandoned seemingly viable free 
exercise claims in favor of the Free Speech Clause.244  
Nevertheless, Smith certainly added to the appeal of a free speech strate-
gy already being embraced by religious freedom advocates.  Once religious 
adherents began to win equal access cases in the Supreme Court on free 
speech grounds, the die was effectively cast.  Even in cases where a Free 
Exercise Clause claim was viable and indeed supported heightened scruti-
ny—i.e., where the government expressly targeted religion for exclusion—
religious adherents litigated claims based on the Free Speech Clause rather 
than the Free Exercise Clause.245   
Internal Court dynamics, including judicial agenda-setting, may also 
have influenced the turn toward the Free Speech Clause.  Reliance on the 
Free Speech Clause resulted in constitutional protection for both freedom of 
speech and the free exercise of religion.  Moreover, it allowed the Court to 
extract itself somewhat from difficult questions regarding the scope of the 
Free Exercise Clause—not to mention, as indicated earlier, the implications 
under the Establishment Clause of granting religious adherents access to 
public places and funds. 
From this perspective, the Rehnquist Court cleverly positioned itself as 
a champion of freedom of  speech that also protected the participatory and 
other rights of religious adherents.  Moreover, the Free Speech Clause fo-
cus may have been attractive as a partial antidote to religious adherents’ 
concerns in the wake of Smith.  Their success in public forum and free 
speech cases deflected charges that the Supreme Court was hostile or insen-
sitive to religious adherents’ rights, or that the Constitution no longer pro-
tected religious rights in any meaningful way.  Granting equal access to re-
ligious adherents was not the same thing as granting religious 
accommodations—i.e., exemptions from generally applicable laws.  Reli-
gious adherents would gain some of that ground back under federal and 
state religious freedom laws.246  However, in the short term, granting access 
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to religious speakers under the Free Speech Clause facilitated religious par-
ticipation in public programs and public life. 
All of these external and internal dynamics pointed toward increased 
and, ultimately, exclusive reliance on the Free Speech Clause in equal ac-
cess cases.  By the end of the 1990s, the Free Exercise Clause had effectively 
been supplanted by the Free Speech Clause.  In the Rehnquist Court’s 
1990s equal access cases, the Free Exercise Clause was not even cited as a 
supporting provision, much less an independent basis for decision. 
4.  Multi-Directional Elaboration 
In many respects, the dynamics in the free speech-free exercise relation-
ship have tracked those in other rights relationships.  For example, freedom 
of speech and other expressive rights have obviously facilitated the free exer-
cise of religion.  The frequent intersection of freedom of speech and free ex-
ercise of religion has influenced our understanding of both guarantees.  
However, this particular rights relationship has also been distinctive in some 
respects.  The extent to which the Free Speech Clause has displaced the Free 
Exercise Clause is one important distinction.  Moreover, unlike the other re-
lationships under consideration, the presence of a third clause—the Estab-
lishment Clause—also has to be accounted for.247  In this particular context, 
the relationship has produced some multi-directional elaboration of freedom 
of speech, free exercise, and establishment principles.  Insofar as religious 
rights are concerned, the dynamic intersection between freedom of speech 
and free exercise has generated both synergy and redundancy.  As discussed 
below, it has also created complications like “hybrid” free exercise claims.  
Freedom of speech has also been significantly affected by this intersection. 
As the decisions of the Hughes Court showed, when rights relate in syn-
ergistic and collaborative ways they can illuminate and strengthen one an-
other.  As I explained earlier, the intersection between freedom of expres-
sion and free exercise of religion during the 1930s and 1940s led to the 
elaboration of core free exercise rights and produced much of the modern 
framework for expressive rights.  Although the Court clearly preferred to 
articulate its decisions in expressive terms, it nevertheless elaborated upon 
the relationship between First Amendment expressive and free exercise 
rights in a manner that strengthened both guarantees.  During this early 
period, the Establishment Clause, whose meaning and implications were 
not well understood, remained mostly in the background. 
 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (prohibiting state action impos-
ing a substantial burden on an institutionalized person’s free exercise rights unless such action is 
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest). 
 247 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion . . . .”). 
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Decades later, a preference for expressive rationales was replaced with a 
free speech supremacy framework in which the Free Exercise Clause largely 
faded from view.  The early synergy and collaboration between the clauses 
also disappeared.  Despite the virtual abandonment of the Free Exercise 
Clause, some religious practices found shelter under the Free Speech Clause. 
With the equal access victories, the Free Exercise Clause was effectively 
subjugated to the Free Speech Clause.  Under this approach, religious ad-
herents became part of a homogenized mass of speakers, all claiming equal 
access to public properties.  Although they were protected from discrimina-
tory exclusion on expressive grounds, religious adherents were not entitled 
to any accommodations based on religious creeds, commands, or beliefs. 
In other words, under free speech supremacy religious exercise is protect-
ed—but only insofar as it can be characterized and treated as religious ex-
pression.  Like other speakers, religious adherents must demonstrate that 
they are communicating some message that is likely to be understood by an 
audience.248  The faith-based nature of religious practices, such as proselyt-
izing and worship, is not relevant to this constitutional inquiry.  Access is 
granted not because of the special religious nature of these activities, but in 
spite of their distinctive character. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this conception of free exercise-as-speech 
would consolidate or merge two separate and distinct rights.  Public forum 
doctrines and free speech content-neutrality principles would crowd out con-
sideration of the religious nature of practices and rituals.  As noted, even 
where the government expressly targets religion for discriminatory treatment, 
the Free Exercise Clause has not been relied upon.  If religion is merely 
speech or speech acts, then the Free Exercise Clause is surplus language.249 
This is not the only interpretive complication that has arisen at the in-
tersection of freedom of speech and free exercise.  When it narrowed the 
free exercise guarantee, Smith also created a so-called “hybrid” rights 
claim.250  The hybrid rights invention appears to save free exercise claims, 
but only if they are attached to some other fundamental rights claim—such 
as a claim that free speech rights have also been violated.  Even assuming 
that we are to take this invention seriously,251 in hybrid free expression-free 
 
 248 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (requiring for purposes of Free Speech 
Clause coverage that a speaker intend to communicate a message through action and that an au-
dience be likely to understand the message). 
 249 See Tushnet, supra note 84, at 72–73 (suggesting the limited scope of free exercise protection, cou-
pled with the robust degree of free speech protection, renders the Free Exercise Clause redun-
dant); cf. Inazu, supra note 180, at 789–90 (claiming the “unified distinctiveness” of the First 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion has been replaced by 
an “undifferentiated free speech framework” that disadvantages the rights of private groups in 
civil society). 
 250 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (recognizing “hybrid” rights). 
 251 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 89, at 1122 (criticizing the concept of “hybrid” rights). 
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exercise claims, the Free Speech Clause again appears to be doing all of the 
work.  In this respect, hybrid claims are simply another vestige of the sub-
ordination of the Free Exercise Clause.  In hybrid claims, a litigant without 
an expressive claim (or some other fundamental rights claim) cannot vindi-
cate her constitutional free exercise rights. 
As noted, the relationship between free expression and free exercise has 
affected a third provision—the Establishment Clause.  Thus, in the course 
of deciding the equal access cases, the Rehnquist Court indirectly elaborat-
ed upon aspects of the relationship among the Free Speech Clause and the 
two Religion Clauses. 
The interaction between freedom of speech and free exercise implicated, 
and in some cases complicated, anti-establishment principles and baselines.  
Those principles are notoriously complicated in their own right.252  In the 
simplest terms, it does not violate the Establishment Clause when religious 
adherents benefit from generally and neutrally available forms of public sup-
port.253  However, the Establishment Clause does impose some limitations on 
official support for religion, including direct forms of financial aid.254 
Using the First Amendment’s public forum doctrine, the Supreme 
Court’s equal access cases adopted a very broad interpretation of permissi-
ble governmental subsidies for religion.255  Again, to simplify matters, if all 
government programs that are open to a diversity of speakers and views are 
treated as public fora, and if access to public fora is the sort of incidental 
benefit to religion the Establishment Clause permits, then it would seem to 
follow that any form of subsidy that can be characterized as a public forum 
must be made available to religious as well as secular individuals. 
This indeed was the Court’s reasoning in cases such as Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor and Visitors of the University of Virginia,256 which invalidated the exclusion of 
a religious student publication from a university’s student activities fund.  
The exclusion of religion, said the Court, discriminated against religious ed-
itorial viewpoints and thus violated the rules relating to regulation of speech 
 
 252 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[C]andor compels the 
acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government ac-
tivity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.”). 
 253 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (allowing a public school 
district to provide a sign-language interpreter for a student at a Catholic high school under a fed-
eral program for the disabled). 
 254 See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973) (“In the 
absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be 
used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that 
direct aid in whatever form is invalid.”). 
 255 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391–93 (1993) 
(analyzing access by a religious group to public school property under public forum doctrine). 
 256 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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in a limited public forum.257  The Court concluded that providing public 
funds to the expressly religious publication would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.258  It reasoned that the student activities funding policy was 
neutral with regard to religion, the religious speech would not be attributed 
to the university, and no funds flowed directly to the religious organiza-
tions.259  The Court concluded that any benefit to religion from neutral ac-
cess to the university’s public forum was merely an indirect benefit to reli-
gion and not an establishment of religion.260 
In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the Court had, for the first time, 
approved “funding of core religious activities by an arm of the State.”261  
He claimed that the provision of student activities funds to a religious pub-
lication violated the rule that “direct aid to religion is impermissible.”262  
Justice Souter also contended that the equal access precedents, which al-
lowed access to speakers for traditional expressive activities in public fora, 
could not be stretched to cover things like the provision of printing funds to 
religious publications.263  The public forum cases, Justice Souter wrote, 
“cannot be lifted to a higher plane of generalization without admitting that 
new economic benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear viola-
tion of the principle barring direct aid.”264 
Rosenberger suggested that under the free speech framework adopted in 
the equal access cases, public forum doctrine had effectively become a new 
Establishment Clause baseline.  During the same term, in Capitol Square Re-
view and Advisory Board v. Pinette,265 the Court held that the Ku Klux Klan 
could erect a Latin cross in a public plaza next to the Ohio capitol building.  
A plurality concluded that communication of private religious speech “can-
not violate the Establishment Clause where it is (1) purely private and (2) oc-
curs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and 
open to all on equal terms.”266  The plurality refused even to apply the Es-
tablishment Clause’s “endorsement” test, which asks whether a reasonable 
observer would perceive the unattended cross as governmental support for 
or favoritism toward religion.267 
 
 257 Id. at 831. 
 258 Id. at 840. 
 259 Id. at 840–42. 
 260 Id. at 843. 
 261 Id. at 863 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
 262 Id. at 884–85. 
 263 Id. at 889. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 266 Id. at 770 (emphasis added). 
 267 See id. at 768 (refusing to apply the endorsement test, arguing doing so would “disrupt the settled 
principle that policies providing incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establish-
ment Clause”). 
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The Court’s injection and application of public forum principles 
demonstrates how the interaction of free speech principles with the religion 
clauses can result in new constructions of both.  In Rosenberger, as in other 
equal access cases, the Court essentially equated public forum principles 
with establishment baselines.  In Pinette, the Court was one vote shy of carv-
ing out a public forum exception for the Establishment Clause’s endorse-
ment test.268  Reliance on the Free Speech Clause altered not just the rela-
tionship between freedom of speech and free exercise of religion, but also 
the interplay among the First Amendment’s free speech, free exercise, and 
establishment provisions. 
As in other relationships, elaboration has occurred in more than one di-
rection.  I have discussed how religious rights have been affected by their in-
teraction with the Free Speech Clause.  But to a degree that has thus far been 
underappreciated, the intersection has also significantly affected interpreta-
tions of the Free Speech Clause.  While this has been true in many respects, I 
will limit the discussion to a few of the most notable interpretive effects. 
Four free speech or expressive complications are particularly notewor-
thy.  First, religious speech cases have significantly affected judicial elabora-
tion of the public forum doctrine.  The early Hughes Court decisions, as 
well as the Rehnquist Court equal access decisions, established and reaf-
firmed the core concept of the public forum and the requirement of con-
tent-neutrality within public fora.269  However, religious claimants were not 
always successful in claiming access to public properties.  As we have seen 
in other contexts, invocation of the Free Speech Clause sometimes leads to 
negative precedents. 
For example, free speech claims involving proselytizing and soliciting in 
public places have sometimes been denied, resulting in a possible narrowing 
of public forum definitions and access rights.  In cases involving Hare 
Krishnas’ efforts to engage in religious solicitation, the Court has denied 
access to some important public properties.270  These precedents have af-
fected the free speech rights of a variety of speakers seeking access to similar 
 
 268 In subsequent cases, the Court has refused to extend this public forum-establishment framework 
to contexts in which no public forum is present or public forum principles are deemed out of 
place.  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478–79 (2009) (holding a municipality 
was permitted to select permanent monuments for a public park without regard to public forum 
principles); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719–21 (2004) (holding the state was not required to 
permit individuals to use public funds for religious education). 
 269 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 109 (2001) (concluding that gov-
ernment had discriminated against religious group’s speech in a limited public forum based on 
viewpoint); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (noting that religious speaker was 
“upon a public street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a right peacefully to impart 
his views to others”).   
 270 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding airport 
terminals are not public fora); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640, 650 (1981) (holding fairground thoroughfares are not open expressive fora); . 
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public properties. 
To be sure, in other religious speech cases, the Court has recognized 
“metaphysical” fora and described a “limited public forum” category that 
at least facially appears to expand speakers’ access rights.271  However, in 
application, these principles seem primarily to benefit religious speakers in 
particular settings, as opposed to private speakers more generally.272  
Further, owing in part to Establishment Clause concerns, in some reli-
gious speech cases the Court has determined that public forum principles 
are “out of place” and do not apply at all—even, for example, in traditional 
public fora such as public parks.273  In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Su-
preme Court held that although town officials had accepted a Ten Com-
mandments monument for display in a public park they were not obligated 
under the Free Speech Clause to accept another religious monument of-
fered by a minority religion.274  The Court held that the government com-
municated through the monuments it accepted, and when it engaged in 
communication rather than regulation it was not required to comply with 
Free Speech Clause access and neutrality rules.275  The Court held that 
public forum principles were not applicable—even though the place in 
question was a public park.276 
Thus, religious speech precedents have contributed both to the con-
struction of the public forum doctrine and to some of its notable ambigui-
ties, complications, and limitations.  These effects are not uncommon when 
rights intersect with one another.  In dynamic elaboration, courts flesh out 
rights relationships by means of the common law tradition.  This often 
leads to ad hoc and even unintended results. 
Second, interpretive complications have arisen with regard to the con-
ceptualization of religious speech.  The Rehnquist Court’s equal access cas-
es raised fundamental questions about the definition and concept of 
“speech” itself.  Some commentators have criticized the Court’s categorical 
treatment of all forms of religious activity—solicitation, proselytizing, pray-
er, teaching, and perhaps even worship—as covered speech.277  Others 
 
 271 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (describing a 
student activities fund as a “metaphysical” public forum). 
 272 See id. at 837.  But see Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 696–97 (2010) (applying 
the limited public forum concept and denying an access claim by religious student group). 
 273 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 478–80 (“[I]f public parks were considered to be traditional public fo-
rums for the purpose of erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would have little 
choice but to refuse all such donations.  And where the application of forum analysis would lead 
almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”). 
 274 See id. at 481. 
 275 Id. at 473–74. 
 276 Id. at 480. 
 277 See Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 381 (chal-
lenging the “routine assumption that religious speech should always be treated the same as other 
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have taken issue with the Court’s insistence, in the equal access cases, that 
the exclusion of religion or religious speech is always and necessarily a form 
of viewpoint discrimination.278  Among other things, this insistence seems to 
elevate religious speech above even political content, which can sometimes 
be excluded from certain public fora.279  As with its public forum interpre-
tations, the Court’s elaborations of “speech” and “viewpoint-neutrality” are 
not confined to laws regulating religious speech.  Thus, they may create po-
tential complications in a variety of unforeseen contexts. 
Third, the intersection between free speech and free exercise rights has 
complicated, and in some cases limited, expressive association rights.  In 
CLS v. Martinez, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state law school’s 
requirement that the Christian Legal Society, which based membership de-
cisions on certain creedal commitments, accept “all comers” into its organi-
zation.280  The Court concluded that the organization’s associational rights 
effectively “merged” with its free speech rights, and applied public forum 
doctrine to reject the free speech claim.281  In Martinez, free speech suprem-
acy displaced not only free exercise rights but associational ones as well.282 
Fourth, and finally, Summum shows how the intersection of religious 
speech and public forum doctrine has contributed to the Court’s articula-
tion of the principle of government speech.  Although the Court has stated 
that the Establishment Clause limits governmental communications to 
some degree, it has been far less clear about whether there are other consti-
tutional limits on government speech.283  Indeed, even the Establishment 
Clause limitation is somewhat uncertain; in some contexts, it apparently 
permits government officials to adopt sectarian monuments.284 
These are just a few notable highlights, intended to demonstrate the kinds 
of complications that can arise when free speech and free exercise rights in-
tersect with one another.  More generally, the discussion demonstrates that 
intersections between constitutional rights can produce significant interpre-
tive changes in many directions.  The study of Rights Dynamism alters un-
derstandings of intersecting individual rights provisions and associated doc-
 
types of speech”). 
 278 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 697 (1996) (“The core 
of the Court’s opinion is unconvincing because it fails to elaborate a plausible account of what 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 279 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–04 (1974) (upholding a public transit 
rule barring political advertisements from city bus advertising spaces, but allowing commercial 
advertisements). 
 280 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697–98 (2010). 
 281 Id. at 680. 
 282 See, e.g., Inazu, supra note 180, at 821–23 (arguing that Martinez undermines both free association 
and free exercise rights of groups). 
 283 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (discussing potential limits on 
government speech, including Establishment Clause-based limits). 
 284 Id. 
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trines, as well as perceptions of the relationships between and among differ-
ent rights.  It reveals a constructive process that is perpetual, subject to many 
influences, and often ad hoc.  Freedom of speech, free exercise, and anti-
establishment principles have been and will remain in perpetual conversation 
with one another, with important interpretive effects for all three. 
III.  RIGHTS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND REDUNDANCIES 
Studying individual rights in active relation to one another, rather than 
as isolated provisions, leads to a deeper and more comprehensive under-
standing of constitutional rights and constitutional liberty.  The study of 
Rights Dynamism also demonstrates the importance of avoiding rights sub-
jugation (the dominance of one right over another) and rights redundancy 
(treating text as redundancy or surplusage).  Notwithstanding their dynamic 
and relational nature, however, this study also shows that we need to main-
tain some conceptual and doctrinal space between constitutional rights.  As 
the examples discussed in Part II show, constitutional liberty is best facili-
tated when robust individual guarantees intersect in dynamic and synergis-
tic ways.  The observations in this final Part are intended to begin, rather 
than conclude, a discussion of Rights Dynamism.  In that spirit, the Article 
concludes by identifying additional rights and structural relationships that 
may be worthy of more systematic study. 
A.  Situating Rights Relationally 
In the legal academy, as well as in broader public discourse, there is a 
tendency to separate and balkanize constitutional rights.  Law students of-
ten study constitutional rights in separate courses.  For example, freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion are often taught in separate courses.  
Even when constitutional guarantees are taught together, instruction tends 
to focus on separate doctrines rather than the dynamic intersection between 
and among different constitutional rights. 
There are of course pedagogical justifications for this rights separatism.  
Doctrinally, as well, separation can simplify analysis and facilitate doctrinal 
clarity.285  However, Rights Dynamism demonstrates that this approach is 
incomplete and problematic.  
Constitutional rights are best thought of in relational terms: i.e., as 
“cognate,” combined, “kaleidoscopic,” or “stereoscopic.”286  As I have 
shown, many rights share historical ties and originating experiences.  In the 
modern era, they have been joined together through litigation, adjudica-
 
 285 See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1130 (arguing against removing doctrinal boundaries altogether). 
 286 Bhagwat, supra note 1; Karlan, supra note 4, at 474. 
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tion, academic discourse, and public debate.  Many of our most cherished 
constitutional rights are actually amalgams and mash-ups—products of ac-
tive intersections and conversations with neighboring provisions. 
Although they are the primary actors engaged in adjudicating intersect-
ing rights claims, courts often ignore or miss these connections.  They seek 
comfort in doctrinal silos.  Doctrinal clarity and precision are important to 
constitutional litigation and constitutional remedies.  However, the study of 
Rights Dynamism shows that rights are often a product of their relationships.  
As Jack Balkin has observed: 
Rights are not simply a fixed set of protections that the state affords or fails 
to afford.  Rights are a terrain of struggle in a world of continuous 
change—a site of ongoing controversies, a battleground where the shape 
and contours of the terrain are remade with each victory.  Rights, and par-
ticularly fundamental rights, far from being fixed and immovable, are mov-
ing targets.  They are worth fighting over because the discourse of rights 
has power and because that discourse can be reshaped and is reshaped 
through intellectual debate and political struggle.287 
Rights Dynamism highlights the fact that that part of the “terrain of 
struggle” consists of the active intersection of rights and the resulting elabo-
rative effects.  An important part of the change we must take into account 
relates to the perpetual interaction of rights in a world that is itself chang-
ing—socially, politically, and constitutionally. 
For example, as Obergefell teaches, due process and equal protection are 
not merely, or always, alternative bases for the same constitutional injury.  
These rights, like others, can inform, illuminate, and facilitate one another.  
Decisions like Obergefell highlight the intersecting and evolutionary nature of 
constitutional rights.  Through a decades-long intersection, due process and 
equal protection produced a new and potentially powerful right to “equal 
dignity.”288  Obergefell is no aberration in this regard.  The decision simply 
makes explicit what is usually a more implicit part of the process by which 
the meanings of rights provisions are worked out—through intersection, 
combination, and association of rights provisions.  
Narrowly construed, constitutional rights are text-based limitations, 
with varying degrees of specificity, on the actions of governments.  They are 
the formal means by which individuals remedy constitutional wrongs.  This 
often leads litigants, courts, and commentators to look for the best “fit” be-
tween the alleged injury and the constitutional text.  
Rights Dynamism points toward a deeper and more complex under-
standing of what rights are and, as importantly, can become.  Individual 
rights provisions are part of a system of rights protections that can be com-
 
 287 Balkin, supra note 11, at 57. 
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bined in ways that lead to new understandings of individual rights.  Rights 
are like atoms, perpetually in motion.  On a larger scale and broader time 
horizon, rights guarantees act as tectonic plates that push in various direc-
tions—sometimes in tandem, and sometimes in opposition to one another. 
It is impossible to fully understand modern conceptions of constitutional 
equality without considering the role that freedom of speech (as well as 
press and association) has played in constructing the equal protection guar-
antee.  What I have called “expressive equality” both facilitated and 
changed First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  As well, First Amend-
ment equal access rights under the public forum doctrine and free speech 
content neutrality rules significantly influenced modern conceptions of free 
exercise of religion.  This relationship has also significantly affected under-
standings of Establishment Clause baselines. 
Studying rights relationally, rather than in isolation, informs not only the 
scope and substance of individual constitutional guarantees, but also in a 
broader sense the nature of constitutional rights and constitutional liberty.  
Rights Dynamism shows that constitutional wrongs frequently implicate not 
individual textual provisions, but pairings or combinations of rights.  When 
rights are brought into contact with one another, a dynamic process is set in 
motion in which they facilitate, innovate, and transform one another.  This 
can lead to remedies that are not available when a single right is invoked.  
Rights can also come into conflict, or become effectively estranged from one 
another.  As the examples in Part II show, the evolution of any particular 
rights relationship is not a pre-determined course; it is a function of a dynamic 
process that includes social, technological, political, and constitutional change. 
We ought to study rights relationships systematically, rather than in re-
sponse to isolated conflicts or developments in discrete areas.  A systematic 
and relational approach will yield several important benefits.  It will clarify 
the remedial implications of cumulative and other types of combined rights 
claims.289  It will highlight doctrinal ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
treatment of related provisions.  For example, First Amendment expressive 
and religious freedom doctrines diverge in various respects, including their 
treatment of symbolic conduct, funding conditions, and government speech.  
Studying these divergences together, side-by-side, may produce valuable in-
sights concerning these rights and their dynamic relation to one another. 
Further, comparing different rights pairings can lead to a better under-
standing of how constitutional rights intersect and converse with one another.  
Insofar as the relationship between due process and equality is concerned, 
neither provision has exhibited any dominant or distortive tendencies.  Free-
dom of speech and equal protection have also generally managed to intersect 
 
 289 See generally Abrams & Garrett, supra note 2. 
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synergistically in many respects.  In contrast, however, the Free Speech 
Clause has largely subjugated its textual neighbors, including the Free Exer-
cise Clause.  What accounts for this difference?  Are some rights more or less 
susceptible to subjugation?  If so, why?  Is the subjugation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause different in kind or degree from the subjugation of the Free 
Speech Clause’s other neighbors, the Assembly Clause, the Petition Clause, 
and the Press Clause?  If so, what accounts for these differences? 
Studying rights relationally will also enhance our understanding of the 
process of constitutional interpretation and construction.  In Rights Dyna-
mism, original or initial rights dynamics are supplemented by intersections 
and associations that occur over long periods of time.  Substantive changes 
are not the result of any grand or purposeful theory of constitutional 
change.  Rather, they are (again, in part) the product of dynamic interac-
tions influenced by litigation strategies, adjudication, academic commen-
tary, and public discourse.  The process of elaboration is diffuse, messy, and 
sometimes erratic.  Over long periods of time, Rights Dynamism produces 
new understandings of constitutional rights.  In sum, Rights Dynamism 
contributes to the study of how and why rights change by explicitly ac-
counting for how rights interact, associate, and converse with one another. 
B.  Dynamism and Pluralism 
In thinking through relationships between and among constitutional 
rights, we should consider how best to leverage negative limits on govern-
ment.  Although constitutional law has many possible goals, let us assume 
that the goal with regard to rights is to maximize constitutional liberty.  In 
order to achieve this goal, two things are necessary: first, individual rights 
must retain their independent and distinctive characters and, second, rela-
tionships between and among rights must be identified, developed, and 
clearly elaborated.  Simply put, in order to achieve an effective form of 
rights pluralism, we need to foster a Rights Dynamism in which rights can 
combine together in facilitative and mutually illuminating ways.290    
Recognizing and addressing the relational nature of rights does not en-
tail minimizing or ignoring the differences between them.  Even at their 
most collaborative, constitutional rights are not an undifferentiated mass of 
liberty.  When rights intersect, it is imperative that they not merge com-
pletely or lose their separate identities.  
We must maintain conceptual and doctrinal space between and among 
constitutional rights.  Textual and doctrinal boundaries can add a degree of 
clarity and precision to rights analysis.  This is not to suggest that rights 
 
 290 Cf. Inazu, supra note 180, at 791 (arguing that First Amendment rights—speech, press, religion, 
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doctrines are a model of clarity—they aren’t—but rather that analyzing 
rights claims is sometimes fostered by channeling them through a particular 
framework or set of principles.   
More pragmatically,  constitutional liberty rests upon a surer footing in-
sofar as claimants can invoke multiple negative limitations on government.  
A government forced to defend its actions against a panoply of related but 
distinctive rights limitations operates in a more constrained environment.  
Rights dynamics that lead to a situation in which one right subordinates or 
supplants another confuse constitutional analysis and undermine constitu-
tional liberty. 
As importantly, this sort of dynamic cuts off opportunities for develop-
ing and understanding the relationships between and among rights.  For 
instance, the Free Speech Clause has so dominated some of its “expressive” 
neighbors—i.e., press, assembly, and petition—that they are now essentially 
considered redundant.291  This has effectively reduced four negative limita-
tions to one.  Treating four rights as one reduces overall constitutional lib-
erty.  By cutting off further exploration of the relationships between distinc-
tive, but related, provisions this interpretation misses important synergies 
that might result from their dynamic intersection.    
Similarly, as explained in Part II, the Free Exercise Clause now oper-
ates under the long shadow of the Free Speech Clause.292  In early interac-
tions, freedom of speech and free exercise provisions offered robust protec-
tion for both individual rights, and also contributed to a strong foundation 
for constitutional liberty.293  Over-reliance on the Free Speech Clause has 
undermined this relationship.  Adherents seeking to practice their religious 
principles have now been transformed into religious speakers seeking to com-
municate religious viewpoints.  This conception of the free speech-free ex-
ercise relationship eliminates critical conceptual and doctrinal space be-
tween these overlapping but distinctive rights.  It also prevents or 
discourages further development of synergistic connections and combina-
tions between them.  
To be sure, reliance on free speech doctrines and frameworks has pro-
duced equal access to public fora for religious adherents.  However, this ac-
cess has been purchased at a significant price.  Public forum and content-
neutrality doctrines do not capture the essence of harm to religion from cer-
tain kinds of governmental regulation.294  Indeed, they standardize religion 
by making it like everything else in the public forum.  As one commentator 
 
 291 See Bhagwat, supra note 1. 
 292 See supra Part II.C. 
 293 See id. 
 294 See Inazu, supra note 180, at 789 (lamenting that the “unified distinctiveness” of expressive and 
religious rights have been replaced “with an undifferentiated free speech framework”). 
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has observed, “destroying a religion is much more than stifling a message.  
It often involves the destruction of a community and a way of life.”295 
Some have argued that particularly after Smith, religious adherents may 
be better off under a free speech framework.296  Free speech doctrines pro-
vide protection for an array of expressive conduct, and require meaningful 
scrutiny of generally applicable laws that incidentally burden expression.297  
However, there are significant questions regarding the extent of protection 
religious adherents can expect under a free speech regime.298  For example, 
treating religion as a viewpoint may make it impossible to provide specific 
accommodations to religious adherents.299  Indeed, any singling out of reli-
gion arguably would violate free speech content-neutrality rules.300  Public 
forum and free speech doctrines may also provide religious adherents less 
protection against governmental funding conditions than do the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses.301  And of course, a free speech framework 
offers no protection at all to religious practices that cannot plausibly be 
characterized as expressive, or to expression that originates with or is con-
trolled by government itself. 
To some extent, arguments about the relative protections afforded by 
the Free Speech Clause to religious practices miss the most important 
point.  We ought not to be choosing between free expression and free exer-
cise rights when it comes to religious liberty.  The possible redundancy of 
the Free Exercise Clause would significantly undermine constitutional liber-
ty by preventing the dynamic intersection of expressive and free exercise 
rights.  Under the current approach, free speech and free exercise princi-
ples no longer collaborate and inform one another.  By treating the Free 
Exercise Clause as redundant text, the Court has effectively short-circuited 
its dynamic interaction with the Free Speech Clause. 
If rights relationships are to be preserved and their synergies leveraged 
in the pursuit of liberty, courts and other interpreters must do a better job 
of explaining how rights facilitate and illuminate one another.  In this re-
spect, it is not enough to say that two (or three) rights are better than one.302  
 
 295 Brownstein, supra note 231, at 185. 
 296 See, e.g., Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861–62 (2000) (arguing the Free Speech Clause protects rights of religious 
adherents in land use area). 
 297 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to 
laws that incidentally burden expression). 
 298 See Brownstein, supra note 231, at 147–64 (examining application of free speech standards to reli-
gious zoning, expression, and conduct). 
 299 Id. at 169. 
 300 Id. at 167–68 (discussing RLUIPA). 
 301 See id. at 175–76. 
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Interpreters need to explain and defend rights relationships with more 
depth and clarity.  
For instance, as the Supreme Court cryptically suggested in Obergefell, due 
process and equal protection focus on separate but overlapping concerns.  
Each provision adds something distinctive to the constitutional mix.  The evil 
of discriminatory laws, whether they are anti-sodomy laws, bans on same-sex 
marriage, or racially discriminatory enactments, can be fully addressed only 
through a combination of due process dignity and equal protection anti-
subordination concerns.303  Courts need to recognize this overlap, elaborate 
relationships between rights more clearly and cogently, and more closely ex-
amine how rights operate in tandem to remedy constitutional harms. 
Among other things, this kind of analysis would provide a more accu-
rate understanding of how independent constitutional rights are often in-
terpreted—relative to one another, or at intersection points that touch 
more than one right at a time.304  Making Rights Dynamism and dynamic 
interpretation more explicit would give us a sense of the relative influences 
of different rights provisions in terms of case dispositions.  For example, it 
would better communicate what “work” the due process, equal protection, 
freedom of speech, and other provisions are doing in cases where two or 
more of these rights are in play.   
Of course, actively combining separate rights provisions does not auto-
matically or always produce valuable synergies.  As Rights Dynamism 
shows, some interactions produce conflicts between rights while others can 
limit or even undermine certain rights.  In a complex system of overlapping 
and intersecting rights, some such tensions are to be expected.  Moreover, 
we must consider the possibility that the combination of rights provisions 
could lead to judicial activism or doctrinal complexities that might not arise 
if courts relied on a single rights provision.305  However, the risk that these 
potential costs will come to pass ought not to be overstated.306  Rights al-
ready operate in relation to one another.  Working to define and explicate 
rights relationships would not only openly acknowledge this fact, but would 
also allow us to openly assess its effects on our system of constitutional rights. 
In sum, to achieve a functioning rights pluralism we must both preserve 
independent rights provisions and work to facilitate synergistic interactions 
between and among them.  Constitutional rights ought to be conceived of 
 
 303 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 483–88 (observing that reliance on both due process and equal protec-
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as independent but “cognate,” “kaleidoscopic,” and “stereoscopic” provi-
sions that operate within a pluralistic system of rights.307   
C.  Other Rights Relationships 
In terms of the systematic examination of Rights Dynamism, the Article 
has focused on three distinctive rights relationships.  These pairings are 
merely exemplary and illustrative.  Other pairings and intersections are also 
worthy of examination.  In addition, dynamic processes and principles 
could also help to explain the relationships between the Constitution’s 
structural and individual rights provisions. 
We might fruitfully begin by re-considering the suite of rights in the 
First Amendment.  As Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat has observed, free 
speech supremacy has created a situation in which independent rights to 
assemble, petition, associate, and publish “might as well not exist.”308  
Scholars have sought to resurrect or reclaim these rights.  However, they 
have tended to do so as freestanding provisions rather than as relational 
guarantees.  We ought to conceptualize and study these rights not as sepa-
rate but related, “kaleidoscopic” guarantees, bound together, as Professor 
Bhagwat argues, by a concern for broad democratic or other values.309 
As a distinctively social right, freedom of speech intersects with a variety 
of constitutional rights.  In addition to the equality and free exercise guar-
antees discussed in Part II, freedom of speech intersects with abortion 
rights, property rights, privacy rights, Second Amendment rights, the right 
to vote, and even the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.  Scholars could focus useful attention on the relational dynamics 
of these rights, and the resulting bi- or multi-directional interpretations.  
Moreover, by comparing and contrasting these pairings, we can further our 
understanding of individual rights, relational dynamics, and dynamic con-
stitutional interpretation. 
The relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is receiving increased attention, particularly in the wake of 
the Obergefell decision.310  Rights Dynamism and dynamic elaboration can 
provide frameworks for examining the progression and construction of this 
relationship as it continues to evolve. 
Rights Dynamism’s framework and insights could also pay dividends 
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with regard to certain criminal procedure rights.  Rather than study the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in isolation, scholars could consider 
the dynamic process in which these rights have interacted and influenced 
one another.  Studying these dynamic intersections might produce better 
understandings regarding how litigants, courts, and others have construed 
and elaborated these rights over time.  Rights Dynamism could also sup-
plement originalist and intratextualist understandings of these rights. 
Obergefell was a single but important turning point in the relationship be-
tween the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  Like all 
rights relationships, the relationship between due process and equal protec-
tion continues to develop and evolve.  For example, in the criminal justice 
context, advocates for the poor have invoked due process and, increasingly, 
equal protection rights in challenges to bail and other monetary require-
ments.311  These new invocations could lead to further elaboration of the 
relationship between due process and equal protection rights. 
Finally, dynamic principles can inform our understanding of how struc-
tural constitutional provisions intersect with constitutional rights.312  As Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe observes, Obergefell is partly the product of the inter-
section between LGBT rights and structural principles of federalism.313  He 
argues that prior decisions, which rested in part on structural considera-
tions, set in motion a “cascade” in which courts and states began to recon-
sider a right to “equal dignity.”314  Eventually, as Tribe notes, the Court 
“recognized that the time had come to jettison the federalism scaffolding 
with which [it] had earlier surrounded that core right.”315  Thus, in the case 
of equal dignity and perhaps other rights as well, constitutional rights and 
constitutional structure may be intricately connected in ways we have not 
yet fully appreciated. 
In sum, Rights Dynamism has considerable range in terms of assessing, 
explaining, and elaborating the Constitution’s rights and structural provisions.  
We can profit by first conceptualizing and then studying constitutional provi-
sions as engaged in dynamic relation and conversation with one another. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article identifies and describes a process in which various constitu-
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tional rights provisions participate in dynamic intersections that affect con-
stitutional interpretation over time.  The process of Rights Dynamism in-
volves many actors and influences—activists, litigants, civic organizations, 
the press, scholars, and the people themselves.  It typically occurs over the 
course of many decades and is perpetual. 
Rights Dynamism is not an interpretive theory.  It does not purport to 
develop or defend normative outcomes.  Rather, Rights Dynamism pro-
vides a partial description and explanation of how constitutional construc-
tion occurs as the result of the dynamic intersection of constitutional rights.  
Intratextualists and originalists have identified the deep textual and histori-
cal tissues that connect rights to one another.  Rights Dynamism recognizes 
and respects these connections.  However, it focuses on more contemporary 
intersections and on the places and contexts in which constitutional mean-
ing is currently being produced.  This occurs in judicial pleadings, adjudica-
tion, legislative enactments, academic commentary, and public discourse. 
A principal thesis of this Article is that constitutional rights are in fact, 
and should be conceptualized as, relational constructs.  Rights of due process 
and equal protection, freedom of speech and equality, and freedom of 
speech and free exercise cannot be understood in isolation.  These and oth-
er rights have all been affected and defined, in significant part, with refer-
ence to their dynamic and ongoing relationships with other provisions. 
We ought to study, teach, and discuss constitutional rights with careful 
attention to their relational character.  To that end, the study of Rights 
Dynamism could develop into a separate field or discipline.  However, the 
primary goal of this Article is far more modest.  It provides a framework or 
perspective for understanding how rights relate to one another and perhaps 
also to structural provisions, by focusing on the processes in which constitu-
tional provisions collaborate, illuminate, and sometimes conflict with one 
another.  By systematically studying this process, we can come to a better 
understanding of the nature of constitutional rights and the concept of con-
stitutional liberty. 
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